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I. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides the purpose and importance of this research, the research 
questions, and the outline of this report.  
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is to investigate the structure, roles, and authority of 
the purchasing functions within large, private sector organizations and to compare 
identified practices, trends, and relationships to the U.S. Air Force’s purchasing 
organization. Specifically, this research is being conducted on behalf of the sponsor, Heidi 
Bullock, director of contracting, Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC), 
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH. Bullock is responsible for the 3,900-person AFMC 
contracting workforce, which executes a $67 billion annual budget to procure major Air 
Force weapon systems, technologies, research and development, and other contracted 
services and commodities (U.S. Air Force, 2017). The goal of this research is to provide 
an executive summary and technical report with recommendations for Air Force 
contracting, along with the complete thesis and analysis, to Bullock for her use to 
implement changes and make improvements within AFMC’s six contracting centers and 
core mission areas. It is important to note the term purchasing organization is synonymous 
with purchasing function, procurement function, and procurement organization throughout 
this report. 
B. IMPORTANCE OF THIS RESEARCH 
General Arnold W. Bunch, Jr., the senior ranking military member within AFMC, 
recognized the criticality and urgency of maintaining the most effective and well-structured 
military force, including the structure and capabilities of the Air Force’s purchasing and 
procurement function: 
AFMC is the most important Major Command (MAJCOM) in the U.S. Air 
Force. It needs to become the most agile and efficient organization to 
achieve the National Defense Strategy and to get the Air Force we need. 
Only if this command works and this command succeeds can the Air Force 
succeed. AFMC built the most powerful Air Force in the world, and our 
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nation is depending on us to build the Air Force we need to secure our 
nation’s future. However, our adversaries have caught up or exceeded our 
capabilities in many areas. Therefore, our command must change at the 
speed of relevance to counter these threats and build and sustain the most 
lethal and ready Air Force. I have directed a command-wide initiative to 
ensure that AFMC has the best structure, resources, and culture to support 
the National Defense Strategy. This is the AFMC we need! (AFMC, n.d.-a, 
“From the Commander” section)  
As industry adapts to ever-changing market conditions, the U.S. Air Force must 
evolve and reorganize its internal structure to foster innovation and stay ahead of the 
dynamic threats to national security. Air Force Contracting (SAF/AQC) continually 
restructures itself to streamline decision-making and optimize purchasing procedures to 
best serve the warfighter, both proactively and reactively. An example of AFMC’s 
organizational restructuring can be seen in Figures 1 and 2. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2012, 
AFMC reorganized its contracting structure as a part of several initiatives set to achieve 
congressionally-mandated budget reductions. The effectiveness and efficiency of the 
organization was assessed following the restructure to ensure that the command’s ability 
to achieve its objectives and meet command responsibilities was not jeopardized (Snyder 
et al., 2013). To maximize efficiency, members must have a clear idea of both the mission 
of the organization and tasks of individual positions to align vision with action. A literature 
review into the research on purchasing organizations and design indicates that the 
purchasing organization and its role within a larger organization play a key role in the 
firm’s success and have a “significant impact” on the firm’s competitive position within 
the market (Glock & Hochrein, 2011, p. 173).  
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Figure 1. Previous AFMC Organizational Structure. Source: S. Manuel 
(email to author, July 7, 2020). 
 
 
Figure 2. Revised AFMC Organizational Structure. Source: S. Manuel 
(email to author, July 7, 2020). 
In FY 2020, AFMC had a spend budget of $67 billion, which equaled more than 
one third of total Air Force spending for the year (Alia-Novobilski, 2020). The overall 
spending responsibility and the more than 85,000 personnel who work in AFMC highlight 
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the importance and responsibility of the organization. As the operating environment 
becomes more complex, it is imperative to the warfighter that supporting organizations 
limit bureaucracy, break through organization inertia, streamline decision-making 
processes, and design their organizations around limiting factors and risks of their 
operating environment. The Air Force contracting community would benefit from a fresh 
perspective regarding its organizational tactics as the community continuously assesses its 
current state and works to identify future areas of improvement. A review of private 
companies that operate in different environments enables the researchers to observe how 
companies structure themselves, evaluate their structure based on their operating 
environments, and make comparisons between their organizations and Air Force 
contracting organizations. By proactively researching organizational structure and design, 
both internal and externally, Air Force contracting organizations may be better equipped 
with information and strategies that allow for the anticipation of changing requirements 
and organizational restructures (as seen in FY 2012) and will equip Air Force leaders with 
best practices and lessons learned from private industry. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The objective of this research project is to answer the following primary question: 
1. How do the Air Force contracting structure, roles, and authorities compare 
with the purchasing functions of private sector organizations? 
Secondary research questions to answer are as follows: 
2. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the current Air Force 
contracting structure within AFMC? 
3. How can the Air Force better organize the its purchasing structure, roles, 
and authorities? 
4. How do the private sector organizations establish roles and authorities 
within the purchasing functions? 
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D. OUTLINE OF THIS REPORT 
The following chapter reviews the background of federal government contracting, 
the AFMC organization, federal government contracting warrants, and the current AFMC 
contracting structure. In Chapter III, a literature review is presented to help readers better 
understand the material being researched and provides the framework for how the research 
is conducted, along with its limitations. Chapter IV provides the methodology used, and 
Chapter V provides the results of the research. Chapter VI discusses our conclusion, 
recommendations and applications, and areas for further research. 
  
6 
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II. BACKGROUND 
This chapter provides background information instrumental to understanding the 
role of contracting and the role of the AFMC/PK department within the acquisition process 
as it pertains to this research. It provides an overview of the history of AFMC, the mission 
and vision of both AFMC and AFMC/PK, and the current organizational design and 
structure for AFMC/PK. Additionally, this chapter briefly outlines the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR) and defines the various levels of contracting authority, contracting 
officer roles, and the contracting officer warrant process. 
A. AIR FORCE MATERIEL COMMAND HISTORY 
AFMC’s heritage can be traced back as early as 1917 to McCook Field, a World 
War I–era installation located in Dayton, OH, which focused on experimental engineering 
(AFMC, n.d.-b). By 1926, the predesignated Air Corps Materiel Division became the 
“largest branch of the Air Corps … responsible for all aircraft and equipment research, 
development, procurement, maintenance, supply, and flight tests” (AFMC, n.d.-b, para. 1). 
Throughout the years, AFMC has had several different names and organizational 
structures. On July 1, 1992, the then–Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) and Air Force 
Systems Command were merged together to form AFMC. The new command joined the 
expertise of both organizations; refocused the new organization’s efforts of providing 
worldwide logistics support through maintenance, modification, and overhaul of weapon 
systems; and offered expertise in the fields of science, technology, research, development, 
and testing. According to the AFMC Office of History, AFMC currently executes 
approximately one third of the Air Force’s budget, supports nine host bases, and is 
responsible for both Air Force medical and test pilot schools (AFMC, n.d.-b). 
B. AIR FORCE MATERIEL COMMAND CENTERS 
AFMC, which is headquartered out of Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, 
focuses its organizational assets around its mission and vision statements by performing in 
six core mission areas: Discovery and Development, Test and Evaluation, Life-Cycle 
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Management, Sustainment and Logistics, Installation and Mission Support, and Nuclear 
Systems Management.  
AFMC (2020) is responsible for 
Powering the world’s greatest Air Force. ... AFMC develops, delivers, 
supports and sustains war-winning capabilities. 
AFMC delivers war-winning expeditionary capabilities to the warfighter 
through development and transition of technology, professional acquisition 
management, exacting test and evaluation, and world-class sustainment of 
all Air Force weapon systems. From cradle-to-grave, AFMC provides the 
work force and infrastructure necessary to ensure the United States remains 
the world’s most respected air and space force. (para. 3) 
AFMC’s vision statement is “Innovative Airmen, trusted and empowered, creating 
agile, cost-effective war-winning capabilities for the Nation” (Air Force Materiel 
Command, 2020). 
According to AFMC (2020), its six core mission areas and one additional 
specialized unit of AFMC are (see Figure 3): 
Discovery and Development: The Air Force Research Laboratory 
(AFRL) is dedicated to the discovery, development, and integration of 
warfighting technologies for air, space, and cyberspace forces. The 
laboratory provides technical services to joint acquisition, logistics, 
aerospace medicine, and operational warfighting communities. 
 
Test and Evaluation: The Air Force Test Center (AFTC) conducts 
developmental test and evaluation missions of air, space, and cyber 
systems. AFTC directs the developmental test and evaluation of air, 
space, and cyber systems for military services other than the Air Force, 
other U.S. government agencies, and international partners. This is in 
addition to AFTC operating the U.S. Air Force Test Pilot School. 
 
Life-Cycle Management: Focusing on cradle-to-grave acquisitions, the 
Air Force Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC) delivers 
affordable and sustainable warfighting capabilities to the United States 
and international partners. The AFLCMC is the single center within the 
Air Force responsible for life-cycle management of all aircraft, engines, 
munitions, and electronic systems. 
 
Sustainment and Logistics: The Air Force Sustainment Center (AFSC) 
provides sustainment and logistics readiness to the Air Force. The center 
9 
provides logistics and sustainment services to the warfighter through 
depot maintenance, supply chain management, and installation support. 
 
Installation and Mission Support: The Air Force Installation and 
Mission Support Center (AFIMSC) is the intermediate-level 
headquarters responsible for providing installation and mission support 
capabilities to the Air Force. The AFIMSC, specifically, provides 
integrated management, resourcing, and combat support operations for 
Air Force personnel, base communications, civil engineering, 
contracting, and other careers. 
 
Nuclear Systems Management: The Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center 
(AFNWC) delivers nuclear capabilities used to deter foes and assure 
global security. The AFNWC acquires and sustains nuclear weapon 
systems and provides nuclear materiel management in support of the Air 
Force Global Strike Command.  
 
Specialized Unit, The National Museum of the U.S. Air Force: The 
museum is located at Wright-Patterson Air Force base and is the world’s 
largest and oldest military aviation museum, which hosts more than 350 
aircraft, vehicles, and misses on display. Note that although the National 
Museum of the U.S. Air Force is an additional responsibility of AFMC, 
it is not aligned with the focus of this paper (AFMC, 2020).  
 
Figure 3. Core Mission Areas and Specialized Unit of AFMC 
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C. AIR FORCE MATERIEL COMMAND CONTRACTING 
RESPONSIBILITIES AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE  
AFMC’s purchasing function is fulfilled by its Contracting (PK) branch. AFMC/
PK orients its mission, vision, and priorities based on Air Force contracting (SAF/AQC) 
and AFMC policy. AFMC/PK is a unique organization due to its two separate chains of 
command: command authority and contractual authority. The command authority of 
AFMC grants AFMC/PK the “authority to use available resources to plan, organize, direct, 
coordinate, and control military forces to accomplish the mission” of the organization (S. 
Manuel, email to author, July 7, 2020). The command authority of AFMC does not include 
the authority to implement or create acquisition policy or procedures for AFMC/PK (see 
Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. AFMC/PK Command Authority. Source: AFMC/PK (2020). 
The contractual authority of legally being able to enter into contracts that bind and 
obligate U.S. government funds is delegated from SAF/AQC (see Figure 5). This 
seemingly subtle distinction of authorities prevents undue command influence on 
contracting officers performing their duties; the separation of authorities allows officers to 
keep a distinguishable line between the priorities of the command to which they are 
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assigned and the charge of obligating public funds that is in the best interest of the taxpayer 
and general public.  
 
Figure 5. AFMC/PK Contractual Authority. Source: S. Manuel (email to 
author, July 7, 2020). 
The mission statement of AFMC/PK (2020) is to “Shape AFMC’s contracting 
workforce, processes, operations to develop, field, and sustain war-winning expeditionary 
capabilities” (p. 4). The vision statement of AFMC/PK (2020) is to be “a valued partner 
for agile, innovative, responsive solutions” (p. 4). AFMC/PK’s (2020) responsibilities 
include the following: 
•  Organize, train, and equip the AFMC contracting workforce to develop, 
produce, test, and sustain war-winning expeditionary capabilities on 
time, on cost, and in accordance with federal acquisition requirements. 
•  Develop and implement an organizational vision that integrates key 
organizational and program goals, priorities, values, and other factors. 
Assess and adjust to changing situations; implement innovative 
solutions to make organizational improvements ranging from 
incremental improvements to major shifts in direction or approach, as 
appropriate. 
•  Design and implement strategies that maximize employee potential, 
connect the organization horizontally and vertically, and foster high 
ethical standards in meeting the organization’s vision, mission, and 
goals. Provide an inclusive workplace that fosters the development of 
others to their full potential; allows for full participation by all 
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employees; facilitates collaboration, cooperation, and teamwork; and 
supports constructive resolution of conflicts. 
•  Assess, analyze, acquire, and administer human, financial, material, and 
information resources in a manner that instills public trust and 
accomplishes the organization’s mission. 
•  Solicit and consider feedback from internal and external stakeholders or 
customers. Coordinate with appropriate parties to maximize input from 
the widest range of appropriate stakeholders to facilitate an open 
exchange of opinions from diverse groups, and strengthen internal and 
external support. Explain, advocate, and express facts and ideas in a 
convincing manner, and negotiate with individuals and groups 
internally and externally, as appropriate. (p. 6) 
D. STRATEGIC INITIATIVES 
SAF/AQC has developed strategic initiatives to become a change agent for the Air 
Force contracting culture.  
1. Tools, Not Rules 
One initiative that AFMC/PK is heavily involved in is the movement toward 
“Tools, not Rules.” This initiative is focused on providing necessary tools for contracting 
officers to make informed decisions, rather than formalized rules that can stifle innovation. 
This initiative is being spearheaded by AFMC Director of Contracting Heidi Bullock.  
2. Build Mission-Focused Business Leaders 
SAF/AQC is focused on attracting, developing, and retaining a talented acquisition 
workforce. Additionally, this initiative is focused on investing in training and workforce 
development.  
E. GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING 
Government contracting has its origins in the U.S. Constitution. Although the 
Constitution does not explicitly state that the government has the right to make purchases 
on behalf of the United States, the constitution laid the framework for future statutes and 
policies granting it authority (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8). As early as 1831, the U.S. Supreme 
Court case ruled that the United States has a “right” to enter into contracts (United States 
v. Tingey, 1831). Due to the nature of spending taxpayer dollars, government contracting 
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is heavily scrutinized and has policies built into its framework to allow for transparency in 
its spending actions. Through delegations of authority, government agencies appoint 
contracting officers to exercise the government’s ability to enter into contracts. 
F. FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION 
Purchasing policies and guidance for the Department of Defense (DOD), including 
the Air Force, is formalized within the FAR:  
The Federal Acquisition Regulations System is established for the 
codification and publication of uniform policies and procedures for 
acquisition by all executive agencies. The Federal Acquisition Regulations 
System consists of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), which is the 
primary document, and agency acquisition regulations that implement or 
supplement the FAR. (FAR 1.101) 
The Federal Acquisition Regulation is found in the Code of Federal Regulations as 
Title 48. Chapter 1 of Title 48, specifically, includes the FAR with subsequent chapters 
outlining supplementing guidance to the FAR for various agencies. The FAR is the 
government’s procurement guidebook; however, not all government agencies follow its 
guidance. Furthermore, there are supplements to the FAR, which include the Defense 
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) as well as specific military branch 
supplements. This includes the Air Force’s supplement to the FAR, the Air Force Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (AFFARS). The DFARS and AFFARS apply only to their 
respective organizations and can supplement information found in the FAR but cannot 
remove, exclude, or disregard any policy set forth in the FAR. Unique to the execution of 
FAR policies, warranted contracting officers are entrusted with implementing and strictly 
adhering to all of its policies and procedures. However, the FAR still may be interpreted 
differently from contracting officer to contracting officer.  
G. CONTRACTING OFFICER ROLE 
According to the FAR, a contracting officer is defined as “a person with the 
authority to enter into, administer, and/or terminate contracts and make related 
determinations and findings. The term includes certain authorized representatives of the 
contracting officer acting within the limits of their authority as delegated by the contracting 
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officer” (FAR 2.1). A contracting officer may be either a government employee, Air Force 
commissioned officer, or Air Force enlisted member who occupies an authorized manning 
position (AFFARS 5301.6, 2020). The term contracting officer should not be confused 
with the term Contracting Officer, which is an Air Force Specialty Code used to identify 
commissioned contracting personnel in the Air Force. Furthermore, the FAR states that a 
contracting officer will not enter into any contracts or bind the government in any way until 
they have ensured all requirements, regulations, and all other applicable procedures to their 
respective organization have been completed. It is also key to note that not all contracting 
officers possess the same levels of authority. Contingent on what authority has been 
delegated, Contracting Officers may only bind the government within the boundaries of 
the authority delegated to them in accordance with policies and their warrant. Specifically, 
FAR 1.602-2 states that contracting officers are responsible for completing all required 
actions to ensure that effective contracting is achieved, enforcing contractor compliance in 
accordance with contract terms and policies, and safeguarding the interests of the United 
States in each of its contractual agreements. The FAR also states that contracting officers 
“should be allowed wide latitude to exercise business judgement” (FAR 1.6). Contracting 
Officers specifically are required to ensure fair and impartial treatment to all contractors, 
be qualified by training and experience required of their job responsibilities and authority 
thresholds, ensure strict adherence to all contract terms and conditions, and ensure all 
Contracting Officer’s Representatives are properly designated in writing to include their 
responsibilities, delegations of authority, and limitations (FAR 1.6). 
H. CONTRACT SPECIALIST ROLE 
Contract specialists, although not defined in the FAR, advise and support the 
cognizant contracting officer responsible for making contract awards and act as the liaison 
between government contractors and the contracting officer. The contract specialist 
prepares all documents, determinations and findings, justifications, and approvals, and acts 
as the key individual who supports contracting officers to make awards; however, the key 
distinction between the contracting officer and contract specialist is that contracting 
specialists do not have the authority to obligate government funds. Since contract 
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specialists are not appointed via Standard Form (SF) 1402, Certificates of Appointment, 
they possess no real authority to bind the government in any way. 
I. THE APPOINTING OFFICIAL 
As stated in 41 U.S.C. 1702(b)(3)(G), agency heads are required to establish a 
system to appoint and terminate warranted contracting officers under their respective 
authorities (41 U.S.C. § 1702). This is reiterated in FAR 1.603-1, which states 
appointments as a warranted contracting officer shall adhere to the guidance set forth by 
the Office of Federal Procurement Policy’s (OFPP) standards identified in OFPP Policy 
Letter No. 05–01, Developing and Managing the Acquisition Workforce, dated April 15, 
2005 (FAR 1.6, 2020). The appointing official, with respect to issuing warrants, is the 
individual who has the authority and responsibility to set warrant limitations and 
delegations of authority. Within the Air Force, the Head of Contracting Activity (HCA) is 
the appointing official.  
J. SENIOR CONTRACTING OFFICIAL 
Within the DOD, the HCA is responsible for appointing and delegating authority 
to Senior Contracting Officials (SCOs), including the appointment of contracting officers 
within their chain of command. If the HCA allows additional delegation of responsibilities, 
SCOs may also further delegate the responsibility of appointing contracting officers to the 
control of regional contracting centers (RCCs). Specifically, SCOs’ warrant authority 
includes the selection, appointment, and termination of Contracting Officer warrants of 
personnel who are assigned to or operating under the respective HCA (Defense Pricing and 
Contracting, 2015). 
K. CONTRACTING WARRANT 
To deem contracts legally binding and obligate government funds, a Contracting 
Officer must have a contracting warrant issued to them outlining the delegations of 
authority and all applicable dollar thresholds. To formalize the appointment of a 
contracting officer within the Air Force, an SF 1402, Certificate of Appointment, must be 
issued to the individual to formalize the delegation of purchasing authority and clearly state 
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all limitations and thresholds the holder of the warrant must follow (AFFARS 5301.6, 
2020). Depending on the delegations of authority, the receiving individual of the warrant 
must comply with all policies and guidance in accordance with FAR 5301.603-2-90, 
Selection. Delegated warrants may require additional training, Acquisition Professional 
Development Program (APDP) certifications, and years of experience commensurate with 
their warrant’s delegated authority (AFFARS 5301.6, 2020).  
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter provides a review, in-depth description, and objective analysis of key 
frameworks that describe purchasing organizations. The following sections focus on both 
the structural and contextual factors of the purchasing organization. A combination of 
literature on the organizational structure of both purchasing and marketing organizations 
is used to feed the conceptual framework discussed in the following sections. The structural 
and contextual elements can be further broken down into nine characteristics that build the 
foundation of the purchasing organization. These nine characteristics provide dimension 
and varying points of view when dissecting organization structure; however, all contribute 
to a common understanding of what researchers mean when discussing organizational 
structure and theory. Each characteristic imparts a valuable piece to the puzzle; however, 
standardization, (de)centralization, and formalization hold the strongest cases for relevance 
and importance to the research around organizational theory, as described in the literature 
review that follows. In addition, these three dominating structural characteristics are crucial 
to defining the contextual factors later defined and discussed. Figure 6 shows the nine 
characteristics that are defined and described in this chapter. 
 
Figure 6. Purchasing Organization Structural Characteristics and Contextual 
Factors 
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A. STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS  
This first portion of the literature review develops the conceptual foundation for 
structural characteristics. Unique from contextual factors, structural components typically 
respond and flex to the operating environment of the organization (Glock & Hochrein, 
2011). An organization will build and define its structure in unique ways depending on a 
number of factors, including dynamics of the operating environment, market conditions, 
and personnel relations, to name a few. The following sections provide a review and 
analysis of the structural elements of an organization: standardization, involvement, 
specialization, configuration, formalization, and (de)centralization. 
1. Standardization 
Research shows that standardization has significant effects on the performance of 
purchasing organizations (Glock & Hochrein, 2011). Industry professionals defines 
standardization of purchasing from three perspectives, focusing on standardization of 
processes and procedures, standardization of materials, and standardization of personnel. 
Research advocates that standardization in purchasing organizations allows for flexibility 
and streamlined decision-making, ultimately making it a significant element in competitive 
success (Glock & Hochrein, 2011). The degree of standardization adopted by the 
purchasing organization varies depending on the characteristics of the industry the business 
participates in and the strategic role of the purchasing organization seen by its senior 
leaders. Research describes standardization of purchasing from three perspectives.  
First, the most widely-accepted description of standardization focuses on the 
processes and procedures within the organization (Garrido-Samaniego & Gutiérrez-Cillán, 
2004). From this perspective, standardization materializes through the synchronization of 
the organization’s regulations, policies, and procedures enforced by upper management as 
a control mechanism. The buying center or purchasing organization has a formalized 
organization structure and enforces the formal structure by directing flows of 
communication up and down command chains. Thus, standardization of purchasing 
procedures fosters a structure in sync with the formal organization if properly executed and 
maintained with an appropriate level of oversight. By standardizing common procedures 
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and giving managers and staff protocols for various situations, the organization guarantees 
the precision of its purchasing decisions as well as accuracy in solving reoccurring issues 
(Sánchez-Rodriguez et al., 2006). By providing automated solutions to routine tasks, 
managers empower staff members to focus creativity and effort on non-routine, pressing 
issues, increasing the effectiveness of the purchasing organization.  
The second lens through which standardization often appears in application is the 
standardization of materials being purchased (Sánchez-Rodriguez et al., 2006). In practice, 
standardization of materials looks to reduce the selections of materials from several sources 
to one single element. Hillier (2002) took that idea one step further into consolidating 
multiple parts into a single component. In industry, standardization in this sense plays a 
key role in cost-savings efforts, as it reduces the risk and vulnerability of the purchase from 
being subject to multiple costs from multiple external parties to just one. This view of 
standardization provides a tangible metric for assessing the performance of the purchasing 
organization and, as Sánchez-Rodriguez et al. (2006) noted, indirectly, the organization as 
a whole. This view of standardization exceedingly grows in significance as the scale of a 
firm’s purchasing strategy reaches the global scale (Trent & Monczka, 2002).  
In addition to standardizing the processes and materials, a third dimension to 
standardization formalizes in standardizing its staff and purchasing positions. This 
interpretation looks to the standardized way a company or organization aligns its 
purchasing staff (Quintens et al., 2006). Trent and Monczka (2002) stressed the importance 
of the cross-functional teams that align under a manager or executive who guides the 
purchasing process. In practice, standardizing the alignment of teams under a focal point 
that provides the overarching guidance and vector proves to be successful in purchasing 
performance, particularly as the organization expands to a global scale.  
Additional research on standardization points to its role under the lens of 
contingency theory (Ruekert et al., 1985). Contingency theory describes the structure of 
the purchasing organization as a result of the uncertainties in the market. Under this theory, 
which provides a hybrid of traditional organizational theory and transaction cost 
economics, standardization materializes in the decision to keep activities internal to the 
organization or seek external solutions. In this sense, standardization becomes a decision 
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of balancing the advantages of maintaining control and competency of core features of the 
organization with the benefits of outsourcing these activities, the answer to which depends 
on the operating environment and market. Ruekert et al. (1985) pointed out that the answer 
also relies on the complexity and characteristics of the task in question. As the unique 
characteristics of the product or task increase in complexity, the greater the benefit of 
keeping the product internal as to reduce the risk of creating a dependence on external 
markets.  
For all three expositions of standardization, the research shows that its role has 
significant implications for managers in considering the structure of the purchasing 
organization, particularly in vying for that competitive edge. As Garrido-Samaniego and 
Gutiérrez-Cillán (2004) set out to assess the various components that characterize the 
purchasing situation, they ultimately found that the standardization of procedures and 
organizational activities had an indirect positive relationship with the organization’s 
performance. The routinization of personnel, materials, and procedures closes the gap 
between risk and uncertainty as standardization inherently decreases variability (Glock & 
Hochrein, 2011). These relationships provide invaluable applications to industries looking 
to gain a competitive advantage in a constantly evolving and dynamic market (Quintens et 
al., 2006).  
Although the research regarding standardization is overwhelmingly positive, it also 
points out the negative impacts of standardization. Trautmann et al. (2009) pointed out that 
risk standardization takes in uncertain environments. This view stems from information 
processing theory, which argues that in situations coated in uncertainty, managers draw on 
and consolidate the information out in the market to eliminate that uncertainty. 
Specifically, as organizations grow both vertically and globally, organizations have to be 
more flexible to adapt to complex markets and supply chains, thus calling for an increased 
flexibility within the purchasing organization (Whitley, 1994). Standardization has its 
place in routine purchases that do not require flexibility and innovation; however, in an 
operating environment that requires a high degree of flexibility as it increases in risk and 
uncertainty, standardization presents a barrier to efficient and effective purchasing. This is 
due to standardization’s potential to impact an organization’s ability to process information 
21 
under circumstances that require a high level of information processing (Glock & 
Hochrein, 2011). For this reason, standardization is not suitable for every purchasing 
situation. 
2. Involvement 
The research regarding the structural characteristic of involvement divides itself 
into three interrelated categories: vertical involvement, lateral involvement, and size and 
extensity (Glock & Hochrein, 2011). When referring to involvement, researchers define 
this characteristic as the interactions and degrees of communication that take place among 
the members of the purchasing organization, in addition to relationships with external 
organizations (Johnston & Bonoma, 1981). Although different lenses apply to the 
interpretation and application of involvement, this characteristic embeds itself in 
communication networks, authority structures, and the process of dealing with 
uncertainties or risks in the purchasing decision (McCabe, 1987). In more recent studies, 
researchers refered to similar concepts in organizational structure as participation, but 
defined the term in the same context of involvement. A common second-order effect of 
involvement in all three contexts reveals a predictor of influence one individual or position 
has on the purchasing organization (Osmonbekov & Johnston, 2018). Despite the research 
being divided in how the idea of involvement is labeled, this characteristic, and a leader’s 
adoption of it, clearly shows a strong correlation to high performance in competitive 
markets.  
Vertical involvement directly relates to the layers of bureaucracies and managers 
seen necessary by senior leaders and the role of communication and visibility cultured in 
the organization. Johnston and Bonoma (1981) defined vertical involvement as “the 
number of levels of the organization’s authority hierarchy exerting influence and 
communicating within the buying center” (p. 146). These levels of authorities start with 
the top-level management and ownership and continue to the lowest operating level of 
employees, with the emphasis on vertical involvement centered on authority. As the 
purchasing situation increases in complexity and importance, the more organizations rely 
on involvement in the purchasing organization. Increases in complexity also increase the 
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need for communication in order to fully understand the intricacies of the problem facing 
the organization. Johnston and Bonoma (1981) also found that organizations relied on 
involvement more in the purchasing of equipment than services, which is rationally 
expected. Modern research on vertical involvement shows that the integration of 
technology most likely decreases the size of purchasing organizations, thus increasing the 
individual weight of the remaining hierarchies. Osmonbekov and Johnston (2018) argued 
that as the size of the purchasing organization decreases, involvement increases as 
responsibility and visibility of the personnel increases, as does the member’s personal stake 
in the decision-making process; however, there is a decreased dependence on authorities 
with the increased reliance on information technology. Although vertical involvement 
historically has proven to be effective, it becomes less relevant as technology increases and 
companies desire to be more efficient and streamlined.  
When dissecting vertical involvement in modern times where technology decreases 
the need for layers on layers of management, contingency theorists view vertical 
involvement as a solution for uncertainties in the operating environment (McCabe, 1987). 
McCabe (1987) found that when a company operates in an uncertain environment or 
market, the ability to predict and prescribe tasks becomes less feasible. Originally, McCabe 
(1987) predicted that companies rely less on formal positions that are useful in predictable 
environments. Instead, McCabe (1987) found that companies rely more on established 
communication networks that are reinforced through vertical involvement. This method 
can be found in contingency theory research done by Lawrence and Lorsch in 1967. 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) suggested the level of involvement that a company requires 
in the purchasing decision depends significantly on the environment in which it operates. 
On the contrary, McCabe (1987) pointed to evidence that employees perceived lower levels 
of vertical involvement with higher uncertainty decisions, as upper-level management was 
trusted to make the best, informed decision. This discrepancy with previous research is 
rooted in the employee’s definition of involvement, and McCabe (1987) suggested that as 
uncertainty in regard to the purchasing situation increases, employees depend on the 
communication networks reinforced through the vertical involvement and less on the 
various authorities involved. This finding is further confirmed through research on the 
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purchasing organizations in public institutions that dealt with relatively predictable buying 
environments and relied less on the vertical management structure and pushed authorities 
down to lower management levels (Schiele, 2005).  
As vertical involvement looks up and down the authority structure, lateral 
involvement refers to the number of departments and cross-functional areas involved in the 
purchasing process (Glock & Hochrein, 2011). This factor varies depending on risk and 
complexity of the purchasing situation. As the purchase situation increases in complexity, 
the need for communication and information-sharing among various subject matter experts 
increases to fully grasp the issue and develop the best way forward. McQuiston (1989) 
pointed out that the number of departments involved being dependent on the complexity 
of the purchase suggests lateral involvement is more fluid than vertical involvement. This 
suggests that lateral involvement structure depends on the organic communication 
networks developed through stakeholder information sharing. Osmonbekov and Johnston 
(2018) looked at lateral involvement through the lens of technology as well, suggesting 
that the incorporation of technology into the purchasing decision will significantly scale 
down the size of lateral involvement required to make a decision. Garrido-Samaniego and 
Gutiérrez-Cillán (2004) related lateral involvement to decentralized decision-making by 
pointing out that as a company further decentralizes its decision-making authorities, there 
is a greater need for lateral involvement, which, in turn, increases the influence or authority 
of those cross-functional departments.  
The research in regard to lateral involvement overwhelmingly suggests that 
organizations depend on lateral involvement as risk and uncertainty of the purchasing 
decision increases (Mattson, 1988). Another important determinant of a purchasing 
organization’s lateral involvement and size relies on the size of the greater organization. In 
1987, Lynn found that large companies leaned on joint decision-making for purchasing 
decisions as a form of lateral involvement. This reliance came from both a luxury of time 
and resources available to which small companies did not necessarily have the same access. 
In contrast, small companies kept purchasing to autonomous individuals. Lynn (1987) also 
pointed out that autonomous decision-making in smaller firms came to be from less 
specialization and less authority delegation found in larger companies.  
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The third facet of involvement manifests in the size of the purchasing organization. 
Although this variable appears similar to lateral involvement, this area of research 
specifically refers to the number of people involved, while ignoring their respective 
functionality (Glock & Hochrein, 2011). Johnston and Bonoma (1981) concluded through 
empirical research that higher quality decision-making directly relates to an increase in the 
size of the purchasing organization. More people involved in the decision-making process 
decreased the vulnerability of risk and uncertainty. The research on the size and extensivity 
of involvement suggests that the more individuals involved in the purchasing decision 
significantly dilutes an individual’s role and influence on the final decision (Glock & 
Hochrein, 2011); however, McCabe (1987) pointed out that although influence diminishes 
in certain purchasing organizations, there is contrary evidence that shows that some 
purchasing organizations maintain a small decision-making unit to maintain authority 
regardless of the number of individuals involved in the information sharing.  
As involvement directly relates to the transparency between all the managerial 
ranks and effectiveness of the communication networks in an organization, its emphasis 
and adoption is crucial to streamlining operations and providing fast, informed decisions. 
Its importance is clear; however, the research defines the concept of involvement under 
different terms, thus slightly undermining its significance in comparison to the other 
structural characteristics.  
3. Specialization 
The structural variable of specialization looks at the labor division within an 
organization. The degree to which this structural characteristic is implemented indirectly 
determines the formal structure of the purchasing organization (Garrido-Samaniego & 
Gutiérrez‐Cillán, 2004). In addition, specialization can be tailored and adapted to meet 
specific needs in environment complexity, uncertain and dynamic task environments, and 
increased dependency on adaptability (Ruekert et al., 1985). Specialization in the 
purchasing function can be oriented by one of two types: function or object (Glock & 
Hochrein, 2011).  
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Specialization by function divides an organization by specific jobs that are easy and 
repeatable (Glock & Hochrein, 2011). Germain and Droge (1998) studied specialization in 
this regard, looking at organizations that divided tasks into design, market research, and 
scheduling. Taking the idea one step further, Germain and Droge (1998) analyzed the 
utilization of specialization by companies that utilized strategic sourcing versus those that 
practiced a less streamlined, traditional buying strategy. Germain and Droge (1998) 
ultimately found that firms that adopted strategic sourcing practices in their purchasing 
function utilized specialization significantly more than firms that used traditional 
purchasing practices, revealing that specialization allows for more efficient and cost-saving 
purchasing practices. In turn, specialization aligned by object can be described as 
employees specializing in a variety of tasks that are interrelated.  
Research proves that both views of specialization are effective ways in which to 
decrease uncertainty and improve effectiveness for purchasing organizations (Glock & 
Hochrein, 2011). In addition, both interpretations of specialization rely heavily on fully 
functional channels of communication connecting the various divisions, so the degree of 
specialization is only as effective as the communication networks set up by the organization 
(Lau et al., 1999). 
Spekman and Stern (1979) examined organizational buying behavior of purchasing 
organizations operating in environments varying in uncertainty. They found that the degree 
of specialization, or division of labor, embraced by a purchasing organization depends on 
the degree of environmental uncertainty the purchasing organization faces. High levels of 
environmental uncertainty require purchasing organizations to be more flexible in structure 
in order to adapt and respond swiftly and promptly. Specialization assists in reducing risk, 
as it allows those with subject matter expertise to communicate the needed information 
swiftly and promptly. Although a division of labor suggests rigidity, the research 
overwhelmingly shows that purchasing organizations dealing with complex products rely 
on the division of labor and the communication networks intertwining these sub-divisions.  
Drawing from both a system-structural perspective and a transaction cost analysis 
perspective of organizational structure, Ruekert et al. (1985) further confirmed Spekman 
and Stern’s (1979) argument by looking at the relationship between specialization and a 
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firm’s adaptability. By specializing, the purchasers fully understand the product or function 
that allows them to respond with clarity to complex problems or changing conditions 
affecting their area of expertise. In addition, these specialists can further develop their 
subject matter expertise and adapt their product or function into new ways of operating. In 
regard to environmental uncertainty, Ruekert et al. (1985) claimed that specialization can 
thrive in uncertain environments, further confirming Spekman and Stern’s (1979) previous 
research. The purchasing organization’s best defense against product complexity and 
environmental uncertainty is to draw on specialization to formulate the most appropriate 
response (Spekman & Stern, 1979).  
4. Configuration 
Another structural characteristic of purchasing organizations is configuration. 
Based on the comprehensive literature review of purchasing organization and design, 
researchers summarize the structural characteristic of configuration as “the design of the 
authority structure of the organization and includes dimensions such as vertical and lateral 
spans of control, criteria for segmentation, and numbers of positions in various segments” 
(Glock & Hochrein, 2011, p. 156). It should also be noted that Glock and Hochrein (2011) 
defined a high level of configuration, based on their many findings from research on 
configuration, as a purchasing organization that “implements a high number of different 
design elements, such as positions, departments, formal communication channels or 
control structures, and that may thus better match the requirements of the purchase 
situations” (Glock & Hochrein, 2011, p. 156).  
Every organization has a formalized authority structure implemented within the 
company, and this structure directly dictates and influences the manner in which 
individuals interact with each other both vertically and laterally. The organization 
configuration lends itself to direct and establish the authorities of senior executives as well 
as the responsibilities of the organizational members directly below the senior executives. 
In additional supporting research, Hall et al. (1967) stated that formal configuration is 
based on both lateral and vertical spans of control; however, they used the term structural 
complexity as a synonym for configuration. Hall et al. further stated that the configuration, 
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or structural complexity, is influenced by the organizational relationships and the number 
of distinctive departments within the organization. Hall et al. (1967) identified the 
indicators that influence the structural complexity as the divisions of labor, hierarchical 
differentiation, and the spatial dispersion of the organization. Areas to consider when 
applying these three indicators are the number of separate and distinct organizational goals, 
the number of major divisions (horizontal differentiation), the number of vertical levels 
within the most complex division, and the distance between organizational members both 
physically and organizationally. They concluded that as the number of hierarchical levels 
increases, so does the size of the organization (Hall et al., 1967). Germain and Droge (1998) 
defined configuration similarly. The two variables Germain and Droge (1998) use to 
describe configuration of purchasing organizations are the number of layers, or “height,” 
of the purchasing organization and the span of control, or “width,” of the senior purchasing 
executive. Within their research, Germain and Droge (1998) hypothesized that just-in-time 
purchasing impacts the configuration of the purchasing organization; however, they 
conclude that there is no significant difference, or requirement, that configuration changes 
as just-in-time purchasing increases. The researchers concluded that the efficiency gains 
are not due to a reconfiguration of the purchasing organization, mainly due to the height 
and span of control width remaining unchanged when adopting a purchasing strategy that 
involves very close involvement between the buyers and sellers of products (Germain & 
Dröge, 1998).  
As a further matter, Wood’s (2005) research on configuration concludes that both 
the degree of formalization and centralization serve as indicators of the type of 
configuration a purchasing organization adopts. The configuration type in a sense leads to 
certain assumptions of the interactions between the organization and outside stakeholders. 
By identifying what type of configuration an organization operates under, the organization 
can optimize where resources are utilized. Specifically, Wood (2005) stated that an 
organization may be classified as one of four types of configurations based on the 
centralization and formalization: 
•  Machine bureaucracy is very formalized and maintains a centralized decision-
making center. 
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•  Entrepreneurial has less formalization due to the centralized nature of the firm 
granting the senior executives’ total authority. 
•  Professional has complex processes, requires formalization of procedures and 
rules, and has a less centralized authority structure. 
•  Adhocracy has a decentralized authority structure and is less formalized.  
According to Pugh et al. (1963), an artifact of configuration is an organizational 
chart. Organizations break into various segments, departments, and activities. The 
respective superiors of these individualized segments on organizational charts are 
illustrated through lines coordinating authorities of who operates over whom. For example, 
the top of an organization chart will be the chief executive responsible for the organization. 
As a topic for future research, Pugh et al. (1963) suggested that configuration is a 
dimension of organizational structure. In their conclusion, Pugh et al. (1963) stated that the 
“shape” of the role structure, which is clearly communicated through the visual of an 
organizational chart, is in fact an organization’s configuration. Configuration information 
may be found in a completely comprehensive organizational chart that outlines and places 
every role within an organization in its unique place. When assessing companies during 
their research, Pugh et al. (1963) continued to use the lateral and vertical spans of control 
as a way to assess the organizations. By measuring how many job positions fell between 
the chief executive and the employees working directly on organizational output, they 
could calculate the “height” of the organization. Pugh et al. (1963) also assessed the lateral 
“width” of the organization by calculating the ratio of subordinates to first-line supervisors 
as well as the percentage of the whole organization that was direct-output employees.  
Johnson et al.’s (2006) research over the 16 years between 1987 and 2003 showed 
a significant increase in the amount of responsibility chief purchasing officers have, as well 
as increased levels of where these individuals report to within an organization. This 
observation leads to a conclusion that chief purchasing officers have increased their level 
of status and influence within organizations since 1987. With the chief purchasing officers 
reporting more frequently to top executive positions within firms, organizational 
effectiveness increases. Furthermore, based on the same research, the average chief 
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purchasing officer’s tenure in their present position decreases by approximately two years 
in experience from 6.1 years in 1987 to 4 years in 2003. This has implications on the supply 
and purchasing functions of organizations. By having a shorter background in their 
respective roles and less tenure, chief purchasing officer performance may be limited, and 
their effectiveness at developing organizational strategies may also be reduced (Johnson et 
al., 2006). Previous research conducted by Johnson et al. (2003) found that the average 
number of years the chief purchasing officer (CPO) held their present position was 8.5 
years in public firms and 7.2 years in private firms. Of the public sector CPOs, Johnson et 
al. (2003) found that 40% of CPOs report to the finance director, while only 14% of CPOs 
did the same in the private sector. The authors attributed this difference to the higher 
emphasis on cost and budget control within the public firms as opposed to private firms, 
which reported to various individuals. The private sector firms reported to operations 
departments nearly one quarter of the time. Assuming the presence of responsibility 
similarities between city/county managers and CEO, executive vice president, and senior 
vice president positions, public sector CPOs and private sector CPOs report to these 
positions in 27% and 32% of the firms, respectively (Johnson et al., 2003). The research 
helps to describe the differences between public and private entities, but the limitations of 
the researchers’ conclusions prime the ground for additional research regarding 
configuration. Meanwhile, McCue and Pitzer (2000) noted that while organizations 
become more decentralized in their purchasing organizations, the organizations’ mid-level 
management positions become redundant, which potentially leads to a flatter organization. 
This, henceforth, will elevate the level, as well as visibility and impact, of purchasing 
functions within organizations (McCue & Pitzer, 2000). 
When considering the influence of structural characteristics on a purchasing 
organization, the size of an organization significantly impacts the overall configuration 
design of the organization. Germain and Droge (1998) suggested that larger firms tend to 
have a wider span of control and an increased number of layers. Pugh et al. (1963) 
suggested that with an increase in the two aspects of size—the number of employees and 
total net assets of an organization—an associated level of bureaucratization comes with it; 
however, counter to Pugh et al.’s (1963) suggestions, Hall et al. (1967) stated that the size 
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of an organization is not in itself a “critical” characteristic of organizations. What Hall et 
al. (1967) continued to argue is that complexity is a much more important characteristic of 
a purchasing organization and may influence the level of bureaucratization more heavily 
than the size of the organization. 
Additional research shows that a high-level procurement officer is critical to the 
organizational design’s effectiveness. In support of having a high-level procurement 
officer within an organization, further research shows that structuring the position so the 
higher-level procurement officer has direct access to senior level executives also increases 
effectiveness. These senior leader positions include the chief executive officer, board of 
directors, or equivalent. By having a very high position within a company’s organizational 
structure, that individual will have higher visibility and additional resources associated 
with the position that can be leveraged, particularly with medium-to-large–size firms. 
Purchasing executives who have similar levels of authority and equal responsibilities as 
other executives are key to an effective organizational design. This is even more important 
if an organization wishes the higher-level procurement officer to effectively contribute to 
the goals and strategies of a firm (Trent, 2004).  
5. Formalization 
Formalization is another component of the six structural characteristics that 
describe purchasing organizations. Glock and Hochrein (2011) summarized their literature 
review findings of formalization as being the extent to which an organization relies on 
rules, procedures, and policies to control and direct the actions of an organization’s 
members. High levels of formalization have historically been a method to minimize 
variability and control purchasing situations to the maximum extent possible and to 
standardize the work performed by an organization’s employees (Glock & Hochrein, 
2011). The level of formalization of an organization, as described in “A Conceptual 
Scheme for Organizational Analysis,” is informed by the extent communications and 
procedures are documented. Pugh et al. (1963) further specify that formalization includes 
“(1) statements of procedures, rules, roles (including contracts, agreements and so on), and 
(2) operations of procedures, which deal with (a) decision seeking (applications for capital, 
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employment, and so on), (b) conveying of decisions and instructions (plans, minutes, 
requisitions, and so on), and (c) conveying of information, including feedback” (p. 303). 
The definition of formalization was again stated in the work of Pugh et al. (1968) as the 
“extent to which rules, procedures, instructions, and communications are written” (p. 75). 
Researchers have measured formalization by assessing whether or not a procedure of a 
purchasing organization was written, and if so, how it was written and whether the 
procedure was filed, and if so, how it was filed, and why a procedure was formalized, 
including whether there was a legal requirement of if it being documented or not (Pugh et 
al., 1963).  
Similarly, research performed by Hall et al. (1967) in their article “Organizational 
Size, Complexity, and Formalization,” reiterates that characteristics of a formalized 
organization are determined based on the proportion of rigidly defined jobs and the 
flexibility and allowed variability in respect to rules that define those jobs. The measured 
characteristics they used in their research included the following:  
•  Roles. The degree to which the positions in the organization are concretely 
defined. The presence or absence of written job descriptions. 
•  Authority Relations. The degree to which the authority structure is formalized 
(clear definition of the hierarchy of authority). The extent to which the authority 
structure is formalized in writing. 
•  Communications. The degree of emphasis on written communications. The 
degree of emphasis on going through established channels in the communications 
process. 
•  Norms and Sanctions. The number of written rules and policies. The degree to 
which penalties for rule violation are clearly stipulated. The extent to which 
penalties for rule violation are codified in writing. 
•  Procedures. The degree of formalization of orientation programs for new 
members (systematic socialization for all new entrants). The degree of 
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formalization of in-service training programs for new members (systematic and 
continuing socialization of new members; Hall et al., 1967). 
Hall et al. (1967) concluded that organizations with a higher level of organizational 
formalization leads that same organization to have more control over individuals within 
the organization by limiting how much discretion and freedom they have within the 
organization.  
Hall’s research concluded, based on interviews with 75 organizations ranging in 
size from six employees to more than 9,000 employees, that there is only a slight tendency 
for larger organizations to be more formalized than small organizations; however, their 
findings were inconsistent, and only smaller relationships could be found, if any, with other 
organizations (Hall et al., 1967).  
One reported benefit of highly formalized organizations is that performance can 
then be assessed more objectively. Without formalizing an organization’s goals and the 
organization’s strategy for meeting these goals, there would be no benchmark controls to 
conclude whether or not the organization is performing to its desired standard. 
Furthermore, Germain and Droge (1987) countered the argument that a more formalized 
organization will prevent quick actions and stifle initiatives internally. Rather, they argue 
that strategic formalization helps coordinate employees toward a singular vision of the 
organization and empowers employees to work toward the shared vision. The strategic 
vision being formalized is different in respect to the previous definitions of formalization 
but is another indicator of how formalized an organization is (Germain & Droge, 1998). 
Germain and Droge’s (1998) argument is countered by the research performed by Lau et 
al. (1999). Lau et al. (1999) found that purchases that are unfamiliar, involve new 
technology, and are novel in nature benefit from a less formalized purchasing structure. 
Novel purchases require the purchasing team to become more flexible, adaptable, and 
innovative to purchase the required items or services effectively. By having management 
relax formal policies and procedures, the purchasing team will be able to operate in the 
environment free from bureaucratic rules that may not apply to the novel-type purchases. 
Furthermore, the buying team will also be able to take advantage of informal routes of 
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communication, which may ordinarily be prohibited due to the strict policies and 
procedures. Hence, fewer rules, procedures, and instructions and an overall low level of 
formalization may be beneficial to the purchasing organization (Lau et al., 1999).  
Additional research has applied contingency theory to formalization and whether 
high or low levels of formalization are best for an organization. Under contingency theory, 
defined as a hybrid of transactional cost economics and traditional organizational theory 
by Ruekert et al. (1985), the formalization of an organization should be contingent upon 
the type of task being performed, the way in which actions to be accomplished are 
organized, and the environment in which the task is being accomplished (Ruekert et al., 
1985). The authors continued to state that formalization, dependent on whether internal 
organization structures or external organization structures exist, is either increased through 
the advancement and enforcement of rules or the creation of legal contracts that control the 
behavior of suppliers and other external parties, respectively. Ruekert et al. (1985) stated 
that when tasks are short and repetitive, performance can be assessed easily and accurately, 
and when the environment is stable and static, an organization will benefit from having 
greater formalization. If these tasks and environment circumstances differ, then a lower 
degree of formalization will be more efficient.  
6. Decentralization and Centralization 
Centralization or decentralization, as documented by Glock and Hochrein (2011), 
are the structural variables that have been most used when researching the purchasing 
organization. Note the term (de)centralization will be used interchangeably when referring 
to decentralization and centralization in this paper. McCue and Pitzer (2000) stated in their 
article, “Centralized vs. Decentralized Purchasing: Current Trends in Governmental 
Procurement Practices,” that centralized purchasing structures are utilized when an 
organization places all purchasing responsibility in one central location for an organization. 
A centralized and decentralized (or hybrid) structure is used when purchasing occurs at 
both headquarter locations and at major divisions or subunits. Lastly, a decentralized 
purchasing structure is used when all purchasing is exclusively handled at the sub-unit or 
major divisions level (McCue & Pitzer, 2000). These underlying definitions are found in 
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many articles and are used as a reference moving forward. In “A Conceptual Scheme for 
Organizational Analysis,” Pugh et al. (1963) stated that there are two types of authority 
recognized within literature and research. First, there exists formal or institutional 
authority, which is derived from a specific position or delegation of authority. Second, real 
or personal authority stems from an individual or individuals who have the knowledge and 
consummate experience that warrants the individual to have authority. The difference 
between formal authority and real authority, respectively, impacts the centralization or 
decentralization of an organization. Pugh et al. (1963) provided the following key factors 
regarding centralization: “(1) the location of the actual decision-making function at 
particular points in the authority structure, (2) the promulgation of rules for decisions, 
which limit the discretion of subordinates, (3) the frequency and thoroughness of review 
procedures and control systems … and (4) the legitimate availability of relevant 
information” (p. 304). Furthermore, the authority and the accountability of the senior 
executive may also be observed. Things to consider when defining the centralization of an 
organization are the limits of the senior executive’s power and discretion in respect to the 
control of resources (human capital, money, time, etc.) and the control of activities being 
performed by the organization (workflow, problem identification, etc.). Another measure 
of centralization within an organization is how quickly authority is lost for each step taken 
away from the senior executive’s position (Pugh et al., 1963). Pugh et al. (1968) made 
another consideration in the article, “Dimensions of Organization Structure,” that added 
additional context to the definition of centralization. The authors stated that centralization 
is directly related to the locus of authority. This locus of authority can be identified by 
answering the question of which level, or position, grants authority to take a formal action. 
By identifying where this final decision of authority is made, the locus of control can be 
determined, and, subsequently, the level of authority can be used to assess whether the 
organization is centralized, decentralized, or has a hybrid structure (Pugh et al., 1968). The 
authors used a six-tier framework to assist in placing and assessing organizations and where 
their respective locus of control resides. The six-tier framework was indicated by a score 
of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5, and had a corresponding locus of authority identified as supervisory, 
workflow subunit, all workflow activities, whole organization, and above chief executive, 
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respectively. Another indicator of centralization identified by the authors includes the 
extent to which members of the organization were required to seek approval and decision 
authority from their respective headquarters, if applicable. This was not a factor for private 
organizations that had complete control over their entire organization but was more 
applicable to government and other larger organizations (Pugh et al., 1968).  
When considering whether to centralize or decentralize a purchasing organization, 
researchers point to a variety of factors to consider, as listed next. McCue and Pitzer (2000) 
highlighted that the “traditional paradigm of public purchasing authority and operations 
were a fundamental principle in order to assure economy, efficiency and integrity in the 
expenditure of public resources” (p. 400). By having a centralized purchasing structure, 
McCue stated that the limiting of direct authority and power of subordinate departments 
ensures professionalism and accountability. In order to have a decentralized purchasing 
structure, the administrative responsibility, authority, and discretion to make decisions is 
delegated to the lower levels of the organization’s hierarchy, or configuration. The 
formalization of rules and procedures must then be sufficiently enforced by the proper 
delegations at the appropriate levels. With that said, it is the lower managerial level 
individuals’ responsibility to develop solutions and execute purchasing at their discretion. 
As documented by McCue and Pitzer (2000), the centralized decision-making authority 
had the top-level purchasing policy flow downward to the purchasing agency, which then 
branched out to each subunit. Decentralized decision-making authority was described as 
having purchasing policy flow down to each subunit directly, with each subunit connected 
to each other. Lastly, the hybrid structure resembled the centralized decision-making 
authority structure with the added benefit of having subunits communicating with each 
other (McCue & Pitzer, 2000). See Figures 7–9 for visual representations of McCue and 
Pitzer’s (2000) findings. 
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Figure 7. Decision-Making Authority in a Centralized Public Purchasing. 
Source: McCue and Pitzer (2000). 
 
 
Figure 8. Decision-Making Authority in a Decentralized Public Purchasing. 
Source: McCue and Pitzer (2000). 
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Figure 9. Decision-Making Authority in a Centralized/Decentralized 
(Hybrid) Public Purchasing. Source: McCue and Pitzer (2000). 
The factors that were highlighted in the Harvard Business Review article, “Should 
Companies Centralize Procurement?” (Corey, 1978) include the ability to standardize, the 
common use of an item, whether items will be needed for long-term or short-term, the need 
for bargaining power in respect to negotiations, the need for specialized purchasing skills 
and knowledge, the uniqueness of requirements, and the predictability or unpredictability 
of requirement quantities. These identified factors help explain when a centralized or 
decentralized purchasing function will operate most efficiently. Corey (1978) noted that 
few factors that affect how purchases are being made lead to an increased need for more 
centralization. These factors include but are not limited to the increased use of complex 
computer-based management systems, a threat of supply shortages and interruptions, an 
increased responsibility and scope of supply needs and opportunities, and a concern of 
competition among private and governmental entities. Due to these changes circa 1978, the 
author concluded that centralization would play a larger role in purchasing organizations 
in the future; however, he also acknowledged that purchasing organizations will have 
various needs and requirements, and a centralized structure is not a one-size-fits-all 
solution (Corey, 1978). 
This point is further supported by Ruekert et al.’s (1985) research, which states that 
a high level of centralization, both internal and external to the organization, can lead to 
better coordination and control of activities associated with tasks. The increased amount of 
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coordination and control will lead to more effective performance within the organizations. 
Using contingency theory as a framework, however, they highlighted that not all 
environments or tasks will lead to an increase in effective performance. Organizations with 
a high level of centralization are more effective only when the individual(s) located at the 
central locus of control have a firm understanding of the tasks at hand. This leads Ruekert 
et al. (1985) to conclude that centralized organizations increase decision-making time and 
may risk placing the decision authority in individuals who are removed from the dynamic 
tasks and environment, which will reduce performance. Decentralized firms, in turn, are 
more effective and better suited for organizations when tasks and the environment are 
likely to change (Ruekert et al., 1985).  
A point of concern, and hesitation by some researchers, is that while 
decentralization has benefits depending on the purchasing situation, there are drawbacks 
to this strategy. By sharing purchasing authority with subordinates, there may be higher 
risks of corruption, fraud, waste, and excessive costs within the organization (Petrucelli & 
Peters, 2016). The concern highlighted is when an increased responsibility is delegated to 
employees, the risk is also increased. Decentralized organizational structures create 
additional opportunities and situations for fraud and mismanagement, which are related to 
the independent thoughts and actions of those delegated higher authorities and 
responsibilities. In Preventing Fraud and Mismanagement in Government: Systems and 
Structures, Petrucelli and Peters (2016) stated a high level of internal controls, adequate 
training and staffing, formalized and documented procedures, and effective 
communication are required of a successful decentralization structure. Counter to the 
traditional paradigm of centralized purchasing authority is balancing the correct functions 
and authority levels so that the accountability, efficiency, and control of purchasing agents 
are still maintained while offering flexibility via delegations of authority to ordinarily 
subordinate positions. Organizations have made structural changes toward a more 
decentralized structure by increasing the level of responsibility and dollar thresholds over 
which subordinate units have total authority. By eliminating procedures and requirements 
to seek authority upward in the chain, decentralization of the purchasing function occurs 
(McCue & Pitzer, 2000).  
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In the 2003 article, “A Comparison of Purchasing’s Organizational Roles and 
Responsibilities in the Public and Private Sector,” Johnson et al. found results 
supplementing Corey’s 1978 research. Using research conducted by the National Institute 
of Governmental Purchasing (NIGP), Florida Atlantic University, and the Center for 
Advanced Purchasing Studies (CAPS), Johnson et al. (2006) found that public 
governmental organizations had centralized, decentralized, and hybrid structures in 51%, 
2%, and 47% of the organizations they surveyed, respectively. The proportions for 
centralized, decentralized, and hybrid structures in private sector organizations were 27%, 
22% and 51%, respectively (Johnson et al., 2006). Johnson et al.’s (2006) research, at 
times, contradicts Corey’s (1978) findings that a centralized purchasing organization will 
play a larger role in these types of organizations. It is important to note that the research 
conducted on private sector companies found approximately one quarter of firms had a 
centralized structure, while the majority, 51%, of firms utilized a hybrid structure; 
however, the majority of public sector firms do utilize a centralized purchasing 
organizational structure. Despite these firms having a high proportion of centralized 
purchasing organizations, Johnson et al. (2003) identified that the trend toward more 
decentralized structures improved purchase response time, eliminated bureaucratic policies 
and procedures, and improved coordination efforts between organizational departments. 
McCue and Pitzer (2000) documented that a decentralized structure may lend itself to 
preventing bureaucratic obstacles and will improve communication and efficiencies 
between departments, as well. Additionally, the authors noted that there is a similar 
percentage of firms that utilize the hybrid structure. The authors stated that the strengths of 
both centralized and decentralized structures can be utilized with a hybrid structure, and 
this hybrid structure leads to organizations decentralizing only the elements of purchasing 
that could leverage these benefits (Johnson et al., 2003). This evidence was previously 
mentioned by McCue and Pitzer (2000) three years earlier, when they stated that cities and 
counties were evolving toward a mixed, or hybrid, structure as opposed to a strictly 
centralized model.  
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B. CONTEXTUAL FACTORS 
In addition to the identified structural characteristics, there also exist contextual 
factors, which are located outside of the purchasing organization. The contextual factors of 
an organization influence the structural characteristics of the purchasing organization, and 
a positive fit between the two is required to reach an increased level of performance. This 
also presents that the structure of an organization is influenced by factors, to include 
contextual factors, that are internal and external to the organization. Developing a strong 
fit between structural and contextual factors leads to efficiencies within the purchasing 
organization. Researchers condense contextual factors into three main categories: 
organizational characteristics, product characteristics, and purchase situation. Researchers 
utilize concepts focused on structural factors to define the organizational characteristics, 
electing to use common trends such as the degree of centralization, formalization, 
standardization, and specialization to describe the characteristics that are central to the 
organization and the impact to the purchasing organization (Glock & Hochrein, 2011). 
1. Organizational Characteristics 
The first contextual factor is the organizations characteristics of the purchasing 
organization. Researchers hypothesize that the organizational strategy directly influences 
the level of structural factors, specifically centralization and formalization, that exist within 
the organization’s purchasing function (Gianakis & Wang, 2000; Johnston & Bonoma, 
1981). Researchers argue that this is often the result of an organization’s policies and 
regulations that are, in turn, represented within the various departments or functions (Glock 
& Hochrein, 2011). Similarly, Crow and Lindquist (1985) hypothesized that the size of the 
organization will also have a direct and associated relationship with the size of the 
purchasing organization. This conclusion can be drawn from evidence showing the 
organization might have the desire to decrease risk, therefore increasing personnel 
involvement in the purchasing process. Other research indicates that the level of the chief 
procurement officer within the organization is critical to organizational purchasing 
performance and efficiency (Trent, 2004). Trent (2004) argued that a higher-level chief 
procurement officer, particularly with direct oversight from a chief executive officer 
41 
(CEO), is essential for maintaining visibility of resources and can improve purchasing 
efficiency. Lastly, Gianakis and Wang (2000) presented evidence that the use of a 
performance measurement system within the organization increases the degree of 
decentralization within the purchasing organization. This supports Lynn’s (1987) 
hypothesis that when employees are held accountable for their performance, they are more 
likely to attain decision-making authority.  
A preponderance of research on organizational characteristics focuses on the 
structure of the organization. While research indicates that organizational structure directly 
influences buying center structure, it fails to account for other factors that may also 
contribute to the purchasing organization’s structure. Some authors argue that the 
organizational strategy is a key factor in determining the structure within a purchasing 
organization (Glock & Hochrein, 2011). Juha and Pentti (2008) identified a variety of 
differing business strategies, referencing technology industries and manufacturing 
industries as a few examples. The researchers argue that technology firms emphasize 
adaptability more so than manufacturing firms, therefore increasing the levels of perceived 
risk the purchasing agents are willing to accept (Juha & Pentti, 2008). Additional research 
focuses on the differences in organizational strategy implemented within the private and 
public sectors. In an effort to understand the differences, Gianakis and Wang (2000) 
hypothesized that public-sector organizations often adopt a customer-oriented strategy and 
thus are more likely to decentralize purchasing decision-making. This results from the 
industry’s desire to meet the customer’s demands using a decentralized decision-making 
construct that allows front-line managers, who have the most information on customer 
needs, to decrease lead times while remaining flexible. Similarly, purchasing organizations 
with a focus on supplier interaction are more inclined to adopt a decentralized approach 
(Corey, 1978). In determining the impact of time pressure on organizational structural 
factors, Lau et al. (1999) argued that organizational strategy impacts the perceived time 
pressure, ultimately resulting in the need to decentralize decision-making in order to meet 
timelines. Through the lens of contingency theory, no single structure directly applies to a 
purchasing organization; therefore, managers should consider external and internal factors 
when determining organizational structure (Ruekert et al., 1985). Organizational strategy, 
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as a company’s internal factor, directly impacts the structural factors of the purchasing 
organization (Mattson, 1988).  
A third variable in organizational characteristics is the size of the organization, 
specifically the size of the purchasing function. Many researchers depict size of the 
organization as a structural variable; however, others argue that the size of the buying 
organization should be viewed under the contextual umbrella (Glock & Hochrein, 2011). 
Trent (2004) hypothesized that as an organization grows in size, it is more likely to provide 
a variety of products and services, primarily due to the access to more resources. This 
theory is built upon the idea that as organization’s size increases, so does the likelihood 
that the purchasing function will be more specialized, therefore increasing employee 
involvement (Crow & Lindquist, 1985). Grønhaug (1975) hypothesized that organizational 
size correlates with joint decision-making in the purchasing process in large organizations, 
therefore increasing the size of the buying center. In addition, Trent (2004) argued that, in 
practice, purchasing organizations should consider adopting or changing various 
structures, such as specialization and centralization, as the size of the organization 
increases. This theory further expands on the contingency theory framework, ultimately 
suggesting that companies should consider both internal and external factors when 
adjusting structural factors (McCabe, 1987; Ruekert et al., 1985). 
Research into the impact of organizational characteristics on the purchasing 
organization overwhelmingly suggests a positive relationship between oversight of these 
factors and company performance. Intuitively, policies and procedures within the 
organization as a whole should directly impact those of the purchasing function; however, 
researchers often acknowledge the presence of the contingency theory framework, 
identifying the impact of both internal and external factors on how an organization 
structures the purchasing function (Glock & Hochrein, 2011; Ruekert et al., 1985). 
2. Product Characteristics 
The first product characteristic addressed by researchers is product complexity. 
Researchers define complexity by the varying levels of product differentiation and 
technical intricacies (McCabe, 1987). The research argues that structural factors of a 
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purchasing organization can be influenced by the complexity of the products being 
purchased. Johnston and Bonoma (1981) found that with increasing levels of product 
complexity, a purchasing organization requires increasing levels of involvement among the 
various functions. As previously discussed, involvement refers to the interactions and 
degrees of communication that take place in the purchasing organization as well as 
relationships with external organizations (Johnston & Bonoma, 1981). The authors argued 
that as product complexity increases, so does the need for communication within the 
organization to share information from both internal and external sources (Johnston & 
Bonoma, 1981). Garrido-Samaniego and Gutiérrez‐Cillán (2004) pointed to empirical 
evidence that supports this concept, while also adding that as product complexity increases, 
so does the size of the purchasing organization. This contradicts modern research on 
involvement that argues that a decrease in the size of the organization will yield an increase 
in involvement (Osmonbekov & Johnston, 2018).  
The second product characteristic variable is the purchase volume, which refers to 
the amount of a product or service purchased. As the purchase volume increases, 
researchers see an increase in cost savings in addition to a decrease in risk. Corey (1978) 
argued that companies should centralize high-volume purchases within the enterprise in 
order to allow for greater cost savings based on a sufficient volume. The author also argued 
that centralizing the procurement of high-volume products requires specialization at the 
enterprise level (Corey, 1978). In contrast, Mattson (1988) found that an increase in 
purchase volume leads to more involvement from top-level management within the 
organization. Mattson (1988) further argued that top-level management is more concerned 
with the allocation of resources when high-volume purchases exist. This lends to the idea 
that a positive relationship exists between the purchase volume and the importance to the 
organization (Corey, 1978; Grønhaug, 1975). Grønhaug (1975) argued that higher-volume 
purchases have an inherent greater perceived risk, which is discussed later in this paper. 
Research on perceived risk indicates that as risk increases, the size of the buying center 
also increases, inferring that an increase in purchase volume will also increase the size of 
the buying organization (Grønhaug, 1975; Garrido-Samaniego & Gutiérrez‐Cillán, 2004).  
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Research into the impact of product type on the structural factors of formalization, 
centralization, and specialization is largely split. A dominant amount of research into the 
business world classifies product types based on mission set, primarily using materials and 
capital equipment (Laios & Xideas, 1994). Laios and Xideas (1994) defined materials as 
“technical items that become part of the final product, parts of the service and distribution 
network, replacement parts for capital items, and supplies for maintenance and repairs” (p. 
14). Capital equipment is described as the equipment used for production or distribution 
that depreciates over time (Laios & Xideas, 1994). Johnston and Bonoma (1981) focused 
on classifying product types by capital equipment and services, arguing that services 
require lower levels of involvement in the purchasing organization while also being more 
decentralized. Laios and Xideas (1994) ultimately concluded that the item defers in 
importance to its complexity, arguing that increases in complexity and importance would 
also increase centralization, formalization, and specialization, respectively. Their findings 
also indicate that the degree of the aforementioned structural factors varies based on the 
phase of the purchase. Trautmann et al. (2009) came to a similar conclusion in regards to 
importance but, however, found that an increase in importance has a negative relationship 
on structural factors. Rather than grouping product types, Trautmann et al. (2009) used a 
portfolio approach that groups products by importance, finding that various levels of 
importance require various degrees of structural factors. The authors indicated that 
organizations should consider structuring purchasing organizations in a similar manner 
based upon the strategic importance of the products (Trautmann et al., 2009). 
It appears that the relationship between product characteristics and structural 
factors cannot be directly inferred or related, potentially resulting from other contextual 
factors that exist with purchasing organizations. A majority of research focuses on extreme 
circumstances of product characteristics in terms of volume, complexity, and type; 
however, most researchers acknowledge the existence of other factors that may have 
caused the respective impacts to structural factors. 
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3. Purchase Situation 
The last contextual factor discussed is the purchase situation, which is defined by 
the experience that employees face during a purchase process (Glock & Hochrein, 2011). 
A majority of the research analyzes five variables of the purchase situation, the first being 
time pressure. “Time pressure is the presence of a very restrictive time window needed to 
exercise a purchase decision, and the extent to which buying center members feel 
compelled to make a decision quickly” (Lau et al., 1999, p. 579). Research indicates that 
when faced with high time pressure, an organization is more likely to adopt an 
organizational design feature that enables rapid decision-making (Lau et al., 1999). Lau et 
al. (1999) found a positive relationship between time pressure and buying center 
complexity, referring to the extent to which an organization uses specialized departments 
and cross-functional teaming. As discussed previously, increasing specialization decreases 
risk caused by purchase uncertainty. By specializing, organizations that regularly face short 
procurement lead-times may expedite the process by leveraging procurement expertise. 
Additionally, the research finds a positive relationship between high time pressure and a 
high degree of centralization within the purchasing organization, while also finding a 
decreased degree of formalization (Lau et al., 1999). This further supports the idea that by 
reducing formal processes and procedures, the organization decreases procurement lead 
times. Garrido-Samaniego and Gutiérrez‐Cillán (2004) confirmed that an increase in time 
pressure correlated with a decrease in involvement and participation within the 
organization, indicating that systemically high time pressure will result in decreased buying 
center size and a higher degree of specialization.  
The second variable within the purchase situation is the perceived risk of a purchase 
from the perspective of the purchasing organization members. Garrido-Samaniego and 
Gutiérrez-Cillán (2004) argued that as the perceived risk increases, there is a respective 
increase in the size of the purchasing organization. This suggests that purchasing 
organizations attempt to compensate for increased risk by gaining access to additional 
information or resources. Other researchers argue that higher levels of perceived risk can 
impact various structural factors of a purchasing organization. Juha and Pentti (2008) 
argued that a high perceived risk within a traditional manufacturing company has a positive 
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relationship on the degree of centralization and formalization. The researchers 
hypothesized that the opposite relationship exists within the technology industry, lending 
to more decentralized decision-making and informal approaches to purchasing. This 
supports the idea that strategy more strongly contributes to the decisions of the purchasing 
organization than the level of perceived risk does. Furthermore, their research supports the 
idea that both internal and external factors should be considered in order to determine the 
organizational structure from the lens of contingency theory (Ruekert et al., 1985).  
A third variable within the purchase situation is the importance of the purchase. 
Researchers define purchase importance as the potential impact within the organization to 
organizational objectives, profitability, productivity or other purchases (Dawes et al., 
1992). Lau et al. (1999) analyzed the relationship of purchase importance and structural 
factors (formalization, organizational complexity, and centralization). The researchers 
define organizational complexity as “the degree of differentiation between groups based 
on the orientation of members and the nature of tasks performed” (Lau et al., 1999, p. 576). 
Empirical results of the study point to a positive relationship between an increase in 
purchase importance and formalization, complexity, and centralization (Lau et al., 1999). 
The authors argue that the increased formalization, complexity and centralization allow for 
information to be readily available in order to meet organizational objectives, which is 
necessary as purchase importance increases. Other researchers find a positive relationship 
between purchase importance and the size of the organization (Dawes et al., 1992; Garrido-
Samaniego & Gutiérrez‐Cillán, 2004). They cite that as purchase importance increases, 
more employees are required to participate in the process to leverage technical expertise as 
a measure to decrease risk, leading to an increase in the buying center size.  
A fourth variable in the purchase situation is the buyphase, defined as “decision 
process stages from problem recognition through intermediate stages, such as search for 
supplier and contract award, to the post purchase stage” (Mattson, 1988, p. 208). Research 
shows a positive relationship between the perceived level of risk and the stage during the 
buyphase (Juha & Pentti, 2008). The research points to evidence that as an organization 
progresses through the buyphase, the perceived level of risk increases, finding that 
perceived risk is lowest during the formative stages of the buying process and increased in 
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the latter stages. This correlates with an increase in formalization and centralization 
throughout the buying process (Dawes et al., 1992; Juha & Pentti, 2008). Ruekert et al. 
(1985) argued that from the lens of contingency theory, organizations should consider a 
flexible approach to structure based on the buyphase. The authors stated that different 
structural levels are required at different stages in the product life cycle, citing that 
organizations should adjust as appropriate (Ruekert et al., 1985). In summary, the buyphase 
that an organization identifies as requiring the most resources will impact the purchase 
situation and, therefore, could impact the structure of the purchasing organization. 
Organizations may choose to structure to specifically support the buyphase perceived to be 
the most impactful or that presents the most risk. 
The final variable in the purchase situation is the buyclass, which is defined as three 
distinct categories: new task, modified rebuy, and straight rebuy (Mattson, 1988). In 
general, researchers accept these three buyclass categories for most research, focusing on 
how structural factors vary based upon the classification (Glock & Hochrein, 2011). 
Research indicates that purchasing organizations that focus on new tasks will tend to adopt 
a more complex structure than those focused on modified or straight rebuys (Crow & 
Lindquist, 1985; Garrido-Samaniego & Gutiérrez‐Cillán, 2004; Grønhaug, 1975; Lau et 
al., 1999). This indicates that purchasing organizations with a new purchase portfolio are 
more likely to specialize purchasing functions in order to decrease risk.  
The contextual factors provide valuable insight to how an organization shapes itself 
in response to factors internal and external of the organization. The combination of internal 
and external factors with the organization’s response to them forms the basis of how 
contingency theorists view contextual factors. The array of research on organizational 
theory points to a number of other contextual factors; however, the three highlighted in this 
section prove to be consistent among all the research and are the strongest cases for 
explaining how an organization responds to its environment to gain a competitive edge. 
C. CONCLUSION  
While conducting the literature review, the context of the research was critical to 
understanding the key findings and implications found within the literature. At the center 
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of the research is the consideration of how the Air Force’s contracting structure, roles, and 
authorities compare with the purchasing functions of the private sector organizations. Prior 
to conducting the literature review, the researchers had no general framework to objectively 
conduct a valuable analysis and comparison. However, following the previous literature 
review, the researchers apply the structural characteristics to both the Air Force purchasing 
organizations and large, private sector organizations. To a lesser extent, contextual factors 
are also considered. 
The research has indicated that structural characteristics and contextual factors of 
organizations play a role and influence, or are influenced by, the organization itself. The 
structural characteristics of standardization, involvement, specialization, configuration, 
formalization, and (de)centralization all are center and most important to answering the 
researchers’ questions posed at the beginning of this paper. Structural characteristics, 
specifically, define the responsibilities and authorities of a purchasing organization and 
also determine how tasks are distributed internally (Glock & Hochrein, 2011). For this 
reason, structural characteristics hold the most importance and are concluded to be the most 
critical considerations when analyzing a purchasing organization. Table 1 summarizes key 
findings, or important discoveries, with respect to the identified structural characteristic, 
implications for organizations, and implications specific to purchasing organizations as 
informed by the preceding literature review. Note that implications for organizations are 
general findings for all basic organizations based on the literature. Implications for 
purchasing organizations are specifically addressed, to include AFMC/PK. 
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Table 1. Literature Review Key Findings and Implications 
Structural 
Characteristic 





Standardization 1. Standardization 
allows for flexibility and 
streamlined decision-
making 
2. Standardization of 
policies and procedures 
increases precision of 
purchasing decisions 
and accuracy in solving 
reoccurring problems 
3. Standardization of 
materials being 
purchased reduces 
redundant selections of 
materials from multiple 
sources to one source 
4. Standardizing staff 
and purchasing 
positions under a focal 
point (e.g., manager or 
executive) allows for 
guidance and strategy 
to be standardized 
1. Standardization of an 
organization’s 
procedures, materials, 
and personnel closes 
the gap between risk 
and uncertainty by 
decreasing variability in 
each aspect  
2. Standardization may 
decrease flexibility of 
organizations that grow 
in size, especially those 
with a global presence  




personnel closes the 
gap between risk and 
uncertainty by 
decreasing variability in 
each aspect 
2. Standardization 
levels should be 
carefully considered as 
the purchasing function 
of an organization 
grows in size 
 
Involvement 1. Increased complexity 
and importance within 
purchasing situations 
leads organizations to 
rely on involvement 
more heavily 
2. As information 
technology increases, 
vertical and lateral 
involvement becomes 
less important 
3. Higher quality 
decision-making 
directly relates to an 





depend on established 
communication 
networks that are 





2. Large organizations 
more consistently rely 
on lateral involvement 
in decision-making due 
to more resources, 
such as personnel, 
time, and availability 
 




which leads to a 
dependence on 
communication 
networks rooted in 
vertical involvement 
and less reliance on 
communication 
networks rooted in 
lateral involvement 
meant for predictable 
purchasing 
environments 
2. High lateral 
involvement is more 
important as risk and 
uncertainty of the 
purchasing decision 
















vulnerability of risk and 
uncertainty is 
associated with larger 
purchasing 
organizations but also 
reduces the influence 
of its individuals within 
the organization 
Specialization 1. Specialization of 
specific jobs or tasks 
can improve efficiency 
and cost savings.  
2. Organizations that 
use strategic sourcing 
were found to 
specialize more than 
those using traditional 
purchasing  
1. Specialization by 
function and object are 
both contingent upon 





reduces risks of 
uncertain 
environments by 
relying on subject 
matter experts within 
respective divisions of 




1. Specialization allows 
purchasers to fully 
understand products 
and/or functions, which 
allow them to respond 
with succinct clarity to 
complex problems and 
environmental 
uncertainty 
2. Specialization by 
function allows for 
more efficient and cost-
saving benefits, as 
purchasing agents 
familiar with the 
market can leverage 
their contacts in the 
specialized market; for 
example, making 
employees responsible 
for different but 
logically connected 
tasks reduces interface 




Configuration 1. Configuration of an 
organization is based 
on vertical and lateral 
spans of control, 
criteria for 
segmentation, and the 
1. Understanding the 
type of configuration of 
an organization offers 
insights into how to 
optimize the use of 
resources 
1. Reconfiguration was 
not found to have a 
significant impact on a 
company’s overall 
competitive stance in 










number of positions in 
various segments 
2. The degree of 
formalization and 
centralization indicates 
the type of 
configuration of an 
organization 
3. Configuration of an 





activities are visually 
represented 
 
2. Chief purchasing 
officers have increased 
their status and 
influence within 
organizations in recent 
decades 
configuration are 
paired with changes to 
internal controls 
2. Chief procurement 
officers reporting to 
executive positions 
within firms increases 
organizational 
effectiveness due to 
higher organizational 
visibility and the 
leveraging of additional 
resources 
3. The overall size of an 
organization may not 
be itself a “critical” 
characteristic of an 
organization; rather, 
bureaucracy within an 
organization stems 
more from the 
complexity of the 
organization itself 
Formalization 1. High levels of 
formalization minimize 
variability and control 
purchasing situations 
2. Formalization is 
informed by flexibility, 
allowed variability, and 
rigidity of defined roles, 
authority relations, 
communications, 
norms and sanctions, 
and procedures 
1. High levels of 
organizational 
formalization lead to 
more control over 
individuals limiting 
discretion and freedom 
of its employees 
2. Performance can be 
assessed more 






toward a singular vision 
and goal 
1. Despite other 
benefits, unfamiliar 
purchasing situations 
and novel purchases 
benefit from a less 
formalized purchasing 
structure 
2. Informal strategies of 
purchasing, less rules, 
procedures, and 
instructions may 
provide benefits to 
unfamiliar purchases 
3. Short, repetitive, 
easily assessed 
performance and stable 
environments benefit 
from greater 
formalization   
(De)centralization 1. The location of 
decision-making, the 
promulgation of rules 
for decisions, the 
frequency and 
thoroughness of review 
1. Centralization is 
directly related to the 
locus of authority, or 
which level or positions 
grant authority to take 





through the limiting of 









procedures and control 
systems, and 
availability of relevant 
information are key 
factors regarding 
centralization 
2. Limits of the senior 
executive’s power and 
the control of activities 
is key to defining 
(de)centralization 
3. Each tier away from 
the senior executive 
and how quickly 
authority is lost is an 
indicator of 
(de)centralization 
4. Public governmental 
organizations are 
approximately half 
centralized and half 
hybrid structures 





decentralized, and half 
hybrid structures 
 
2. Specialization and 
standardization are 
considerations of a 
centralization strategy 








4. High levels of 
centralization are more 
effective only when 
individuals located at 
loci of control have a 
firm understanding of 
tasks and 
responsibilities  
power of subordinate 
departments 
2. (De)centralization is 
not a one-size-fits-all 
solution and varies 




3. Higher risks of 
corruption, fraud, 
waste, and excessive 
costs may result from a 
decentralized structure 
4. Decentralized 
structures lead to 
improved purchase 
response time, reduced 






5. Hybrid structures 
allow organizations to 
utilize the strengths of 




Although contextual factors provide valuable insights into how an organization 
shapes itself in response to the various contextual factors of its environment, the 
researchers concluded that these factors were not central enough to their research to 
incorporate into their interviews, which are discussed in subsequent chapters of this report. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided a literature review applicable to the primary and secondary 
research questions. Specifically, the literature review was comprised of research into 
identified structural characteristics of a purchasing organization and related contextual 
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factors. The nine factors discussed are standardization, involvement, specialization, 
configuration, formalization (de)centralization, organizational characteristics, product 
characteristics, and purchase situation. The next chapter includes a discussion of the 
researchers’ methodology, the development of their data collection strategy, the interview 
process, and data collection procedures.  
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IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
In this chapter, we describe our methodology, the development of our data 
collection strategy, the interview process, data collection procedures used to compile 
information, and research limitations. The research methodology developed by the 
researchers was created with the primary and secondary research questions as the focal 
point of their research. As stated in Chapter I, the primary research question that the 
researchers aim to answer is:  
1. How do the Air Force contracting structure, roles, and authorities compare with 
the purchasing functions of private sector organizations?  
To the maximum extent possible, the researchers also aim to answer the following 
secondary research questions:  
2. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the current Air Force contracting 
structure within AFMC? 
3. How can the Air Force better organize its purchasing structure, roles, and 
authorities? 
4. How do private sector organizations establish roles and authorities within the 
purchasing functions? 
A. RESEARCH METHODS  
The primary goal of this research includes addressing how large companies utilize 
and align their purchasing function within their organizations. The overarching goal was 
to better understand industry best practices in using the purchasing agent as a strategic tool 
to achieve a competitive edge over other companies in the same industry, including 
building alliances with suppliers and utilizing global category management techniques. 
Specifically, the researchers completed qualitative research focused on understanding and 
analyzing primarily qualitative data. The researchers followed guidance from The SAGE 
Handbook of Qualitative Data Analysis to identify the meaning of participants’ 
descriptions and explanations and to help guide the understanding of the main ideas 
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conveyed during interviews (Maxwell & Chmiel, 2013). Redundant and non-value-added 
data were not coded while analyzing the interview data. Data that was not related to the 
research questions was determined to be non-value-added. For example, one interviewee 
discussed their use of surveys to identify skill gaps within their organizations for future 
internal investment opportunities, which although interesting, was not related to the 
interview questions. The guidance emphasized the importance of utilizing coding 
categories in respect to the data so the material and content of gathered qualitative data 
could be sorted, filtered, and separated from other data. The SAGE handbook reports that 
many qualitative researchers view coding as fundamental to qualitative analysis and the 
only activity a researcher will engage in that manipulates data. It is also stated that it is 
important to understand the risks of neglecting real contextual relationships. This has 
occurred when researchers fail to consider the context as influential on coding the data 
(Maxwell & Chmiel, 2013). 
The researchers utilized a multiple case study approach. As defined by SAGE 
Research Methods Foundations, a case study “focus [es] on a single person, incident, or 
phenomenon to examine a theoretical issue in-depth offering a holistic analysis which may 
employ diverse methods of data collection and analysis” (Thomas, 2019, p. 2). More 
specifically, the cases may be, but not are not limited to, persons, projects, policies, 
interviews, and previous research. The subject of the study is comprised of key cases of 
the structural characteristics as they pertain to the various organizations with which the 
researchers conducted interviews. It is important to note that the subject of the study was 
selected due to it being an interesting and illuminating example of the distinctive 
characteristics of the object (Thomas, 2019). The object, or the analytical frame the subject 
illuminates, is identifying how the Air Force contracting structure, roles, and authorities 
compare with the purchasing functions of private sector organizations. Specifically, the 
objects were derived from the structural characteristics and contextual factors identified in 
the researchers’ literature review (e.g., standardization, involvement, specialization; 
Thomas, 2019). Based on the definitions and components of a multiple case study 
approach, the benefits of considering several cases and looking for themes, takeaways, and 
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congruities among each individual case, this approach is best suited to answer the research 
questions posed at the beginning of this paper.  
The researchers generated a case history describing each of four firms in business-
to-government (B2G) markets. Through the SAF/AQ–sponsored program of Education 
With Industry (EWI), the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) has developed 
relationships with many private sector companies. Contacts from the EWI program were 
used to identify potential companies to interview. The researchers considered the company 
diversification, company size, diversity of the purchasing function as identified from a 
business overview, and the potential benefits to the Air Force if the research team were to 
conduct research on their company. One specific goal when identifying potential 
companies was to seek out large organizations with workforces comparable to that of the 
Air Force. As of January 1, 2020, the Air Force is comprised of 328,255 active duty 
members and 145,789 civilian full-time employees (Air Force Personnel Center, 2020). 
In order to collect the information necessary to answer the research questions posed 
at the onset of our project, our group contacted the Air Force EWI program manager for a 
list of companies that the Air Force currently held relationships with. From the list of 51 
companies the EWI program manager provided, the researchers narrowed the list down to 
nine companies most likely to provide insights relevant to the research questions. To make 
this determination, the researchers prioritized having a diverse group of companies to 
interview and sought companies with greater than 100,000 employees or that were similar 
in size to the Air Force, companies with a diverse purchasing function, and company 
background information that assisted with identifying potential benefits. The researchers 
considered a purchasing function to be diverse if it had more than three segregable business 
segments. The potential benefits of interviewing each company were considered to ensure 
that structural and contextual elements could be compared with AFMC/PK. Due to the 
companies having similar contextual factors, the researchers were able to analyze the 
structural characteristics. Furthermore, due to conflicts and legal barriers within several 
companies, the research team identified and developed a backup list of companies to 
interview contingent upon their success with the originally identified companies.  
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The researchers sought interview participants in the upper echelons of the 
purchasing organization or related function, as higher-positioned employees were likely to 
be more in touch with the adapting strategic vision of the organization while also able to 
elaborate and explain basic tactical procedures within their organizations to meet strategic 
goals. A researcher–interviewee agreement was put in place with each participating firm 
to keep all company-identifying information as well as interviewee details completely 
anonymous. Thus, names of the focal firms are not listed in this report. Table 2, however, 
summarizes nonidentifiable background characteristics of nine companies the researchers 
selected as potential focal cases. 
Table 2. Archival Data on Target Companies for Interviewing 








Aerospace, defense Aerospace company and manufacturer 
of commercial jetliners and defense, 
space, and security systems. Manages 
global partnerships with more than 
20,000 suppliers and partners. Operates 
a diverse four reportable segments. This 
company produces and markets 
commercial aircraft and conducts 
research, development, production and 
modification of manned and unmanned 
aircraft, command, control 
communications, computers, 
intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance systems, and space 
exploration. 
Yes Yes 
Technology Prioritizes the delivery of products and 
services to each of its customers within 
its three business segments. Its 
customers include consumers, sellers, 
developers and enterprises, and 
content creators. It currently 
manufactures and sells electronic 
devices and develops and produces 
original media content. 
Yes Yes 
Technology Develops and supports its software, 
services, devices and solutions to 
include cloud-based services, platforms, 
and content, to include online 
Yes Yes 
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advertising. Its various products include 
computer operating systems, 
applications, business solution 
applications, desktop and server 





Provides package delivery services, 
transportation and distribution, 
contract logistics, ground freight, ocean 
freight, air freight, customers 
brokerage, and insurance and financing 
services to more than 200 countries and 
territories worldwide. It operates three 
key business segments. 
Yes Yes 
Global airline company In addition to its main airline tickets 
revenue stream, this company has 
created revenue streams to reduce risk 
from cyclical trends to include a 
subsidiary energy company for fuel 
supply solutions. 
Yes No 
Defense technology  Operates within five business segments 
to develop products, services, and 
solutions to include but not limited to 
land- and sea-based radar solutions, 
combat and ship electronic and sensing 
systems, cybersecurity, missile and 
combat systems, and space systems. 
Yes No 
Technology  Designs, manufactures and markets 
smartphones, personal computers, and 
tablets and sells other services. The 
primary customers of its products and 
services include small and mid-sized 
businesses, consumers, education, and 
government markets. 
Yes Yes 
Global airline company Transports its customers and cargo to 
domestic and international destinations 
to include North America, Asia, Europe, 






Operates four business segments to 
include services such as transportation, 
e-commerce, and business services to 
more than 200 countries and territories. 
It also covers services that support its 




In 2005, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) developed a framework to 
counter and prevent poor acquisitions processes and structures within the federal 
government. The intent of the framework was to equip government agencies with the 
knowledge, tools, and feedback necessary to improve their ability to acquire goods and 
services efficiently and effectively (GAO, 2005). The GAO used the framework when 
consulting federal government and industry leaders to answer GAO research questions. 
The researchers used the GAO framework questions as a basis for our interview questions. 
The GAO’s research is closely related to the research of this paper and hence served as the 
basis for the creation of the interview questions. The questions were modified only when 
necessary to make logical and coherent sense in the context in which they would be asked. 
More specifically, the questions used in the research were focused solely on the six 
structural characteristics identified in the literature review, as the research is focused on 
using those characteristics as the framework for answering the research questions. 
The interview questions had two objectives when designing the interview 
questions. First, the interview helped define and elaborate the functions, strategies, 
structures, and practices each organization engaged in with respect to its purchasing 
function. The researchers utilized data from the interviews and open discussions with the 
participants to compare Air Force purchasing functions with each respective private sector 
organization. Second, the interviews were designed to elicit information from a diverse 
group of companies to provide multiple perspectives and insights and allow the researchers 
to consider a wide range of factors when analyzing the data. 
B. DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES  
All interviews were held remotely via a videoconference or teleconference 
platform. Interview questions were provided before each interview for the participants to 
review at their discretion. A brief explanation of the interview and purpose was given 
within email correspondence and at the beginning of each interview. Organizations that did 
not respond within a timely manner were eliminated from the researchers’ interview pool. 
The researchers’ first step to collecting data was an analytical discussion between 
the researchers and procurement experts or senior executives of large corporations. 
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Interviews were held with a vice president, head of global supply chain management, chief 
counsel to the chief procurement officer, global government contracts compliance officer, 
and a senior subcontracts manager. These interviews generally lasted an hour, and 
interviewees were picked due to their placement in the procurement function as a subject 
matter expert for that specific corporation. During the interviews, one researcher was 
responsible for asking all interview questions, while a second researcher observed and 
ensured that the discussion was relevant to their research questions, and the third researcher 
strictly observed and transcribed all questions and answers. A list of questions asked to 
interviewees is in the Appendix. 
As a second step, the researchers held an approximately one-hour interview with a 
distinguished professor of supply chain management with 30 years of experience at a top 
U.S. institution. Their subject matter expertise included the fields of supply chain 
management, purchasing function organization, and organizational performance. The 
interview allowed the researchers to supplement and extend their analysis of data with 
subject matter expert considerations.  
The researchers additionally consulted many documents throughout the research 
process. Documents and reference material consulted included company Form 10-Ks, 
company websites, journal articles and papers written about companies, and performance 
history. A summary of data sources and their quantities is found in Table 3. 
Table 3. Summary of Data Sources and Quantities 
Data Source Quantity 
Interviews with private organizations 3 (3 hours) 
Interviews with subject matter experts 1 (1 hour) 
Documents and reference material 34 documents 
Websites 23 websites 
 
Interviews were recorded and transcribed, yielding a total of 21 double-spaced 
pages. One researcher engaged in coding the data. The researcher, applying SAGE guiding 
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principles of coding, focused on the application of codes derived from the literature to the 
interview data. The researcher labeled and grouped selected segments of text into 
categories based on the theoretical frameworks discussed in the Literature Review (Sun, 
2018). Coding results were then discussed among the three researchers to better define, 
organize, and subcategorize the codes.  
At the conclusion of the discussions, the segments of text were grouped into nine 
codes. Six of these codes came from the original structural discussion found in the 
literature. Following the detailed analysis of the coded text, the following dimensions were 
identified: standardization; involvement; specialization; configuration; formalization; 
(de)centralization or a hybrid model of both, known as a center-led approach; CPO roles; 
vendor management; and procurement policies. The latter three are elements that came up 
consistently in the interviews as significant dimensions the companies considered when 
making purchasing decisions, yet these are difficult to place into just one of the structural 
components found in the literature, as they are woven throughout all six of the structural 
characteristics.  
For clarity purposes, a brief discussion of the latter three elements needs to be 
addressed before moving into the research results. It is important to note that these three 
codes are significant in their own right; however, they each have elements among each of 
the six structural characteristics and are addressed within those components. The CPO roles 
code addresses the roles and responsibilities placed on the CPO of the company. This code 
came to light when interviewees consistently emphasized the placement and role of the 
CPO in relation to the other C-suite executives. Although the role of the other C-suite 
executives is important to the overall direction of the company, interviewees stressed that 
the CPO had a large hand in determining the battle rhythm of the purchasing procedures 
and employees. The CPO had an advising role to the CEO on best practices in purchasing; 
thus it was deemed important to discuss this role in the greater scheme of the role of the 
purchasing agent.  
Another code that was deemed significant was vendor management, or how the 
purchasing function managed its relationship with vendors and business partners. For each 
company interviewed, a recent focus was a reevaluation of its supply chain management. 
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Having a good working relationship with vendors appears to have a direct correlation to a 
company’s competitive bearing. This mindset appeared to be a recent shift in the 
company’s strategic objectives, but a shift that was significant to both overall operations 
and the company’s perceived success. For this reason, a company’s relationship with its 
vendors and its management strategy for these vendors became a significant code to 
incorporate in the overall evaluation of the companies interviewed. 
The procurement policies of a company relate to the structural characteristics found 
in the literature, in how they are formalized and standardized, but they do not address actual 
methods of how the buying agent buys. As companies start to see their purchasing agent 
as a strategic asset that can be proactively used to gain a competitive edge, the processes 
that are put into place become more and more strategically significant. The companies 
interviewed that actively used the purchasing function as a strategic agent aligned 
purchasing policies to overall mission and vision goals. This allowed the company to use 
the purchasing agent not only as a cost-savings agent, but also as a tool to maximize buying 
potential and operational reach. This was found to be a significant aspect that needed to be 
addressed in the findings and analysis; thus, the researchers deemed it necessary to address 
this practice as its own code.  
Furthermore, the researchers were unable to assess or analyze the contextual factors 
within the organizations sufficiently through this study while also acknowledging the 
variance in contextual factors across AFMC at the centers. In order to adequately assess 
contextual factors, a specific study would need to be conducted. Additionally, the research 
team acknowledges that contingency theory is evident specifically for contextual factors 
and therefore do not believe it to be fruitful to analyze them. 
The discussions between researchers led to several findings. The content of the 
interviews and case studies results in the identification of several considerations and 
lessons learned, which may be applied to Air Force purchasing organizations. 
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the development of the researchers’ research methods, 
interview and data collection procedures, the process of coding the data, and research 
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limitations. The researchers used multiple sources of data including private company 
interviews of senior-level purchasing executives, consulted with a subject-matter expert, 
and used case studies to develop our analysis.  
The following chapter discusses the results based on the identified codes mentioned 
in this chapter. First, the interview data is discussed. Then, general results are presented 
and interpreted. Finally, other remaining data and considerations are discussed. 
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V. RESEARCH RESULTS  
This section identifies the common practices of the placement, roles, and 
responsibilities of the purchasing function within organizations in the private industry. 
These following paragraphs summarize research findings from interviews with 
procurement experts, highlight purchasing characteristics in practice that are consistent 
with the research, and point to findings that came to light that were both surprising and not 
necessarily in line with the established research.  
The interviews show that the role and structure of the purchasing function fluctuate 
depending on a number of factors; however, the characteristics that companies consistently 
relied on in structuring the purchasing agent were centralization, specialization, and 
standardization of the purchasing function. Although the researchers found a theme of the 
structural characteristics among all the companies interviewed, the ways in which they 
were implemented were highly variable. The contextual characteristics were found, but 
mainly in relation to the structural components, and they were not relied upon. Thus, they 
are discussed in the subsequent sections within the structural components to which they 
relate. 
A. FINDINGS 
The research team analyzed each case based upon the six structural characteristics 
identified in the literature review. As addressed in the literature review, the three contextual 
characteristics were not deemed to be central to the research at hand and will not be 
addressed in the findings and analysis. Three additional themes were found but are related 
to two or more of the structural components and are thus addressed within the related 
structural components. Information from each interview was coded based on the respective 
structural characteristics identified by the researchers. Additional information was gathered 
on the purchase situation for each respective organization.  
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1. Organization A (Interviewees: Chief Counsel to the CPO and Global 
Government Contracts Compliance Officer) 
Organization A recently went through a transition in which the purchasing function 
that was initially viewed as a purely cost-saving function became a strategic asset. This 
organization is a major logistics company, a leader within the industry, with an 
international operating portfolio. Over the past 4 years, this organization converted to a 
centralized purchasing approach, with the chief procurement officer reporting directly to 
the chief finance officer. Purchasing previously operated autonomously by distinguished 
regions, but in an effort to optimize spending and prevent duplication of effort, purchasing 
was restructured to be conducted within a vertically aligned procurement group. The CPO 
withholds purchasing authority for any purchase of assets greater than $4 million or any 
purchase of strategic importance, such as aircraft. 
At the time of the interview, the organization was establishing and formalizing 
procurement policies and procedures. The formalization process is the responsibility of a 
purchasing center of excellence, which is responsible for analyzing previous purchases that 
were deemed successful in an effort to replicate those policies across the organization. The 
organization previously used a purchasing card program that allowed internal stakeholders 
to rapidly make small purchases; however, due to compliance issues and duplication of 
efforts across multiple spend categories, the organization is eliminating the program 
entirely. When the program is fully eliminated, all purchasing, regardless of dollar value 
or strategic importance, will be routed through the procurement group. 
Within the organization, procurement officers specialize their skills based on 
commodity types or specific spend categories. In situations in which the organization does 
not have the necessary skillset, it partners with a consulting firm. The organization has 
recently placed more focus on category management and strategic sourcing. In order to 
maximize profit, the organization hopes to cut expenses by using strategic sources to fulfill 
company needs globally. 
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2. Organization B (Interviewee: Senior Subcontracts Manager) 
Organization B is a large manufacturing company within the Business to 
Government (B2G) and Business to Business (B2B) realm. The purchasing function is a 
hybrid, center-led model, with aspects of both centralized and decentralized decision-
making. A center-led approach allows  centralized strategic decisions to be made at the 
executive level, while also allowing decentralized subunits to perform purchasing 
functions. Organization B has two lines of authority within this approach, the first of which 
goes to the functional director, who reports directly to the chief procurement officer. The 
second is within the specific program, which has its own purchasing authority.  
This organization relies heavily on formalized and standardized processes and 
procedures. Due to the high volume of B2G agreements, the organization’s procedures are 
similar to those outlined in the FAR. Additionally, most of the B2B relationships also 
follow formalized procedures and regulations. The delegation of purchasing authority is 
also formalized within the job descriptions for procurement officers. Purchasing authority 
is based upon a level system as required by each program and requires applicants to 
demonstrate the knowledge to hold that authority. In order to ensure that purchasers adhere 
to the formalized processes and procedures, a compliance team reviews all contracts over 
$100,000. The compliance team does not fall within the chain of command but serves as a 
partner in ensuring that purchasers are compliant with regulations. 
Specialization within this organization is based upon the program to which a 
procurement officer is assigned. Organization B does not specialize based upon spend 
categories, but rather by program. Organization B categorizes and defines a program based 
upon business function. In B2G, a program is defined as a government program for which 
Organization B is the supplier and has to manage its supply chain to produce a product. 
B2B programs are primarily based upon a product line where Organization B has a desired 
end state as customer. A procurement officer assigned to a program is expected to conduct 
all purchases for that program, regardless of product type or complexity. The exception to 
this level of specialization occurs if trends are identified within the formalized purchasing 
system. A category management team is responsible for identifying multiple requirements 
across separate programs in order to prevent future duplications of effort. Purchasers are 
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not required to get a breadth of experience across multiple programs. Procurement officers 
may continue to work on a program as long as specific metrics were met, allowing for some 
level of specialization within the purchasing team. 
3. Organization C (Interviewee: Vice President, Head of Global Supply 
Chain Management) 
Organization C is an international air carrier based in the United States. The current 
purchasing function is highly centralized, with a team of approximately 130 procurement 
professionals. Procurement professionals have the authority to make purchasing decisions 
up to a dollar threshold, with the final authority coming from the president or vice president 
of procurement. Exceptions exist for items of strategic importance, such as aircraft, which 
are procured by the president of procurement. Additionally, procurement officers operate 
in close coordination with internal stakeholders who determine the purchasing 
requirements. This team approach, as well as the purchasing authority, allow procurement 
officers the ability to rapidly respond to requirements. 
Rather than formalizing purchasing processes and procedures, Organization C uses 
a purchasing decision tree to give procurement officers the tools they needed. The decision 
tree is used as a training tool that allows procurement officers to make better informed 
decisions based upon specific inputs and situations. The lack of formalized rules allows 
procurement professionals to make purchases rapidly in what was described in the 
interview as a complex purchasing situation. While purchasing is centralized within the 
company, the specific purchases require a global supply chain and intricate communication 
channels with internal stakeholders and procurement officers.  
Procurement officers are responsible for categorizing spend within their specific 
purchasing portfolio; however, the organization does not rely on purchasing specialization 
in terms of specific items or purchasing situations. Procurement officers may be required 
to purchase various commodities or services within their portfolio. The exception is the 
purchase of aircraft, which is maintained by the president of procurement. The company 
does evaluate risk within purchasing portfolios as a mechanism to determine the size of the 
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team required. When specific skillsets are required to support a portfolio, the organization 
uses consulting firms that specialize in those specific skills.  
4. AFMC/PK 
As a DOD organization responsible for contracting all products and services for 
AFMC, AFMC/PK must adhere to the formalized policies and procedures as outlined in 
the FAR and applicable supplemental guides. AMFC/PK has historically been highly 
standardized through AFMC–specific mandatory procedures (MP) and Procedures, 
Guidance and Information (PGI); however, recent guidance has attempted to remove 
AFMC–specific MPs and PGIs and instead align with Air Force guidance. This paradigm 
shift harmonizes with the SAF/AQC initiative of “tools not rules.” AFMC/PK does not 
have contract clearance authority over the individual AFMC centers. Contract clearance 
authority is delegated to the centers’ Senior Contracting Officials (SCOs), unless otherwise 
identified in the FAR as requiring SAF/AQC approval.  
There is not a push for specialization toward singular products and services. 
Instead, contract professionals gain a breadth of experience across multiple programs and 
contract types. Any specialization that is developed is unintentional and a corollary to a 
person’s time and experience in the career field. Career progression plans advise personnel 
to gain a breadth of contract experience by rotating among the different program offices; 
however, these plans are merely recommendations and are not strictly enforced, resulting 
in individuals staying in certain programs long enough to become “specialized” in that 
program.  
AFMC/PK is decentralized in terms of contract clearance authority; however, it is 
centralized in terms of command authority. Contract clearance authority is held at the 
individual centers. This allows the centers flexibility to make rapid decisions, utilizing 
formalized FAR regulations as checks and balances to ensure that acquisitions are legal 
and appropriate. AFMC/PK holds centralized command authority delegated from the Air 
Force Materiel Command Commander (AFMC/CC). Additionally, the role of AFMC/PK 
is to ensure that acquisitions align with the AFMC strategy and guidance. This approach 
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can be considered a modified hybrid approach, with AFMC/PK implementing and aligning 
strategy centrally and decentralizing contract clearance. 
5. Supply Chain Expert (Distinguished Professor of Supply Chain 
Management) 
The researchers interviewed a supply chain expert with 30 years of experience at a 
top U.S. institution to solicit information on how the purchasing function impacts supply 
chain management and category management. The interviewee indicated that first it must 
be understood that private sector companies exist in a cost-driven culture. In cost-driven 
culture, the easiest way to increase cost savings is to simply exhaust supplier capabilities; 
however, recent evidence indicates that this is not an effective long-term strategy. The 
interviewee indicated that when analyzing the purchasing function, there must be an 
understanding that two groups exist, those focused on the procure to pay (P2P) function 
and those focused on transactional execution. In order to effectively implement P2P, 
organizations must first understand how to categorize spend data and then use that data to 
determine what categories to organize by spend. 
The expert explained that a two-phased approach is necessary for effective P2P and 
category management. First, organizations should focus resources on conducting spend 
analysis and analyzing that data against suppliers and their respective supplier risk. The 
second phase should be focused on category management, allowing procurement 
professionals to become experts within their respective categories in order to become 
embedded within those categories. Category managers should be focused on market 
intelligence in order to develop formalized category strategy that describes how to build 
and manage that category.  
The expert indicated that an important factor to consider is the impact of 
technologies on spend analysis and category management. Category managers should be 
in close communication with a technology team with the intent of developing systems that 
automate spend analysis and category management as appropriate for that organization. 
Additionally, category managers should be interacting with customers to determine 
requirements and how they fall within specific categories. 
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Lastly, the expert indicated that there is no specified model that describes how to 
effectively organize the purchasing function within the organization. The expert discussed 
the impact of organizational strategy, specifically the impact that a new CEO can have on 
the purchasing function if they have little data to support their decision. The expert argued 
that rather than analyzing the specific organization of the purchasing function, it may be 
more effective to analyze the internal controls of the purchasing function. Table 4 
summarizes the structural characteristics of the focal organizations identified.  
Table 4. Structural Characteristics of Interviewed Organizations 
 Organization A  Organization B Organization C AFMC/ PK 
Standardization Move toward 
standardized 
procedures in 
recent years due to 
duplication of effort 
among various 
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The research team identified several advantages and disadvantages of AFMC/PK 
structural characteristics when compared to the interviewed private sector organizations 
which will be discussed in the following sections. 
1. Standardization 
A common practice of private companies is to standardize their purchasing 
procedures; however, the research team found that companies varied their purchasing 
procedures based on the customers they were serving. This initial finding is consistent with 
the literature regarding standardizing processes, which states that the practice positively 
correlates to a company’s success in a competitive market as it clears the air of any 
ambiguities. This practice consistently appeared across companies of various missions and 
industries in extant research, suggesting that following a common operating procedure 
clears any gray area in purchasing decisions in any industry and allows for the purchasing 
agent to optimize spend in both critical and routine buys.  
We found that centralization of the purchasing agent plays a key role in a 
company’s decision to standardize its purchasing processes. In interviews with 
Organizations A and C, which have completely centralized their purchasing agents, there 
was less need to standardize, as purchasing for the entire company was handled by a small 
group of individuals who were all well-versed in the established purchasing procedures. It 
was only recently that these companies shifted to thinking of the purchasing agent as a 
strategic component; thus standardization of purchasing had not been considered 
previously. Although there was less need, the companies were considering standardizing 
purchasing procedures for some routine purchases by formalizing their purchasing 
procedures for continuity purposes and expediting purchases that were necessary but of 
less strategic importance. As mentioned previously, Organization A had recently started 
utilizing a common purchasing website for smaller purchases such as office supplies, a 
concept that is found in government contracting as well and is often considered a successful 
program. Organization B utilized standardization of purchasing processes for established 
weapons systems and program offices, but the practice was not strongly emphasized in the 
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interview as a best practice. There was a larger emphasis on the autonomy available for 
purchasers who held buying authority at higher dollar thresholds to allow for quick 
decisions on purchases that fell in more ambiguous and less developed realms, such as 
developing technologies. As a check, Organization B utilized an internal auditing 
component separate from the purchasing organization that was dedicated to ensuring 
compliance for these autonomous decisions. This committee merely tells the purchaser 
whether the decision is within the legal boundaries of business practices. Organization B 
was also in the process of standing up a Center of Excellence to standardize and publicize 
best practices in procurement in order to optimize its spending power. This Center of 
Excellence will stand as a reference point for other purchasers to communicate best 
practices but will not necessarily tie them to one method over another. This simplified 
clearance threshold and establishment of a single focal point both allow purchasers more 
flexibility and autonomy in their decisions and are found to be best practices for this type 
of company.  
Although the practice of standardization itself was consistent, the reasons for 
implementing it varied among companies, depending on their focus. Companies that focus 
on manufacturing, compared to delivery and distribution, were ahead of the curve 
regarding standardizing purchasing procedures. This finding is also consistent with the 
literature regarding the situational characteristics of a company in that the product type 
influences the role of the purchasing agent within a company. Reasons ranged from 
correcting historical missteps to mirroring practices found in the government.  
AFMC/PK is highly standardized in its processes and procedures in utilizing the 
FAR, its applicable supplements, and mandatory procedures. This practice aligns with 
Organization B, which is appropriate; however, these organizations differ greatly in how 
Organization B successfully incorporated certain rules that allowed unique, non-
standardized decisions to be made at the lower purchaser levels. In addition, this practice 
led to a high perceived level of work satisfaction by employees and high degrees of 
ownership from purchasers with this authority. While the high degree of standardization 
found at AFMC/PK does have its place and is appropriate for routine purchases and buys, 
a degree of autonomy in areas that are less developed and require quick decisions or more 
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flexibility, such as developing technologies, has been shown to provide many unique 
benefits in the appropriate situations.  
2. Involvement 
The dimension of involvement proved to be a lower priority for the focal 
companies, with only small degrees of vertical and lateral involvement. This omission 
proved to be unintentional; however, when pressed about the degree of lateral and vertical 
involvement, the interviewees all expressed that communication among entities was not 
significantly emphasized from leadership as a metric of success.  
Vertical involvement was only emphasized in the large defense contractor as an 
important rule of engagement. This was executed in establishing review and approval 
levels within the chain of command as a measure of peer review, yet the interviewee 
expressed that this procedure was an effort to align with best practices found in its largest 
customer, the DOD. In addition, this emphasis on approval levels via the chain of command 
was less emphasized than it is in the Air Force, for the defense contractor also relied on 
technology and a purchasing/contract writing system that had internal checks and balances 
as well. This reliance on technology and smaller degree of emphasis on lateral involvement 
aligns with the research conducted by McQuiston (1989). In regard to lateral involvement, 
the large logistics company addressed communication among the entities; however, they 
did this only to the extent that the purchasing function worked with other entities to 
understand their requirement, but nothing more beyond that relationship was emphasized 
as important. This is contrary to the literature stating that there exists a strong correlation 
between high levels of communication between departments and a company’s perceived 
financial success, specifically measured by the success of the purchasing function in getting 
the best product at the best cost (Glock & Hochrein, 2011).  
For Organization C, lateral and vertical involvement was less emphasized as a result 
of having a very small, centralized purchasing function. This is consistent with the research 
that shows both lateral and vertical involvement increase when a company deals with 
products or services that are higher in risk than normal, day-to-day purchases. Although it 
was surprising to find the lack of emphasis on lateral and vertical involvement, the 
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companies interviewed confessed that the procedures and roles of the purchasing function 
had never been examined through a strategic lens until recently; thus a look at the degree 
of lateral and vertical involvement might be something to consider in the future.  
Both lateral and vertical involvement is something the Air Force, and AFMC/PK, 
does quite well in comparison to the private sector. There is always room for improvement, 
yet AFMC/PK recognizes the advantage in working in an environment that fosters high 
levels of communication both up and down the chains of command and across the 
departments within each center. The degree to which that is actually practiced could not be 
accurately assessed, as interviews were not conducted with the centers themselves or with 
Air Force Installation Contracting Center (AFICC). As a result, the nature of this finding 
is partially skewed. By nature of its size and wide portfolio of mission sets, AFMC cannot 
function properly without effective communication between its purchasing function and 
the supported entities.  
3. Specialization 
The companies interviewed all incorporated a degree of specialization to their 
purchasing procedures, seen as a best practice for knowledge management and 
streamlining acquisitions. The level to which the specialization was adopted varied 
depending on the centralization of the purchasing agent and the product produced. For 
example, Organizations A and C, with centralized purchasing agents, incorporated a degree 
of specialization by allotting important buys to certain procurement experts. In their 
interview with Organization C, the researchers learned that all of the purchasing for the 
fleet of airplanes was done by one individual who had the appropriate level of authority, 
knowledge, and expertise to execute a critical purchase category for the company. All other 
purchases were done by separate, centralized purchasing functions, dividing work less by 
specialization and more by workload management. In the interview with Organization A, 
the researchers were told that the centralized purchasing agent was divided into different 
sectors, specializing in categories parsed out by the customer. As a result, the other 
functional areas of the company had a specialized purchaser who worked with the customer 
to determine the need and could then complete the purchase for that functional area, 
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because of the purchaser’s  established history with that functional area. This was a new 
tactic that had recently been implemented, but it had been well-received when compared 
to the previous decentralized strategy in which purchasers were assigned to a region and 
responsible for a portfolio of buys.  
For a more decentralized company, specialization still has its place and function. In 
an interview with Organization B, the purchasing expert discussed how the decentralized 
structure allowed for specialization organically. The purchaser is assigned to a specific 
program office that does the purchasing for one specific product or weapons system. 
Within that program office, the product is broken down further into different levels and 
parts to the weapons system, with a purchaser assigned to each part depending on the dollar 
threshold of that specific part. There might be some overlap in purchasing strategies 
laterally across program offices, but predominantly, the purchasers in a program office 
specialize in the purchasing strategy and tactics of that one program office. This allows the 
purchaser to fully own the product, find the best suppliers, and build strategic relationships 
with the corresponding supply chain. These relationships and purchasing strategies are 
critical to the success of the defense contractor due to the nature of the product they create 
and the main customer they serve.  
The researchers found that AFMC/PK does not emphasize specialization in 
knowledge management toward a specific category of purchasing. This is not to say that 
specialization cannot be found within AFMC/PK; however, any specialization that is found 
is a mere consequence of an individual’s tenure in the office. On the contrary, AFMC/PK 
utilizes both a civilian and military career progression program that emphasizes a wide 
range but also deep knowledge of contracting procedures for all products and services. This 
finding does not align with the companies interviewed, and it is recommended that 
opportunities for specialization by both civilians and military members be considered for 




The structural characteristic of configuration, in regard to established chains of 
command, was not a strong element found among the companies. Both Organizations A 
and C had one purchasing office that reported to the CFO. In Organization B, the individual 
directors reported to the global supply chain directors, who ultimately reported to the CEO. 
This is consistent with previous research that identified direct reporting of the CPO to C-
suite executives advantageous for improved purchasing performance and efficiency (Trent, 
2004); however, when interviewed organizations were asked about the advantages of the 
respective configurations, they were unable to identify any tangible advantages. 
AFMC/PK relies heavily on established chains of command, especially considering 
that it falls under two major commands. Having established command structures eliminates 
any confusion on where command authority lies, who is responsible for what authority, 
and who answers to whom; however, in terms of contracting authority, AFMC/PK does 
not have clear lines. In relation to private sector organizations, AFMC/CC would be the 
equivalent of a CEO, with AFMC/PK not an active part of the purchasing process. Instead, 
SAF/AQC, with contract clearance authority over $1 billion, serves as the CPO, and the 
individual centers are delegated purchase authority less than $1 billion. This configuration 
is inappropriate for SAF/AQC and AFMC/PK since SAF/AQC does not fall within the 
chain of command of AFMC.  
5. Formalization 
As discussed in the previous chapters, the structural characteristic of formalization, 
or extent to which the purchasing processes and procedures are codified and relied upon to 
control for variables, was not strongly present in the companies interviewed. It is another 
characteristic in which AFMC is leading the charge; however, a position on the far side of 
formalization also serves as a hindrance to innovation, speed, and potentially work 
satisfaction, as discussed later. A new attempt in that direction was expressed by both 
Organization A and Organization C to account for variables in purchasing decisions and 
tighten up processes that had never previously been documented or formalized. This shift 
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toward efficiency by formalizing processes and procedures aligns with the research 
conducted regarding formalization. 
Organization B had defined roles and responsibilities that gave the purchasing 
organization an internal structure. The company also relied upon policies and procedures 
that mirrored the FAR; however, the interviewee emphasized that purchasing decision 
flexibility was granted to purchasers authorized at higher dollar thresholds so they could 
operate autonomously, which would allow for more flexibility and efficiency. The idea 
was also expressed that this method of autonomous purchasing decisions led to greater 
work satisfaction from the purchasers working at this company. When pressed on how the 
company checked for compliance issues, the interviewee explained that all purchases were 
vetted and checked through the purchasing IT system used by the company, thus allowing 
for purchasers to make unique decisions from time to time when deemed necessary, but 
still ensuring that all purchasing decisions aligned with the company’s overall strategic 
vision and mission. This hybrid model of formalization that trades risk in formalizing 
procedures based on the complexity of the task or environment in which the task is 
performed also aligns with the research conducted on formalization.  
If Organizations A and C represent one side of the spectrum in which few 
procedures and policies are formalized, then AFMC represents the other side, where most 
all policies, procedures, and communication to that extent are documented and formalized. 
This extreme has both benefits and downsides, with one significant benefit being that there 
is little confusion or gray area for routine purchases, leading to faster execution times; 
however, in a world where there is an increasing reliance on new and emerging 
technologies but no formalized policy on these technologies, then operations could 
potentially slow down or come to a standstill until said policy is discussed, approved, and 
formalized.  
6. (De)centralization  
Before diving into the individual characteristics laid out in the literature review, the 
researchers first looked at the role of the purchasing function in the overall strategy of the 
organization as discussed by the experts. The literature emphasizes the significance of the 
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purchaser’s role in the grand scheme as a critical player in streamlining operations, saving 
manpower hours, and building strong alliances with suppliers. In our interviews and 
research, the significance of the purchasing agent was recognized but not always to this 
full extent, and in some cases, for reasons other than pure finances. An interview with 
Organization A revealed that the role of the purchasing function had never been fully 
recognized until 2016. By trying to keep up with adaptations to faster and smarter 
technologies, this company came to the mindset of using its purchasing agent as a tool for 
competitive success rather than just a purchaser.  
In an interview with Organization C, the researchers were told that the company 
had also just recently reviewed the strategic role of the purchasing agent. Instead of just 
focusing on how to streamline acquisitions, this company decided to also strengthen its 
relationships with suppliers by offering to invest in start-up companies to disrupt current 
duopolies for various purchasing categories (e.g., food catering). By investing in start-ups 
that threatened the established duopolies, this corporation was not only able to give small 
businesses opportunities to refresh recurring services, but also drove the prices down while 
increasing the quality of the products and services offered by the incumbent contractors. 
This shift in strategy was driven by a customer-focused mentality rather than a profit-driven 
mentality. In a similar scenario, purchasing experts completed a case study of an energy 
company and found that the role of the company’s purchasing agent was built into its 
mission statement (Handfield & Nichols, 2002). Instead of solely seeing purchasing as a 
function of saving money and increasing stakeholders’ value, the energy company saw 
better purchasing as a way of gaining loyalty with customers, or in a sense, of streamlining 
supply chains to increase the company’s responsiveness to a dynamic set of customer 
needs. Although the literature reviewed emphasized the critical role of the purchasing 
function to the overall success of the company, our research found that only a few 
companies were actively using it as a tool to gain a competitive edge within the global 
market.  
When looking at the structural characteristics of the purchasing function, the 
manner in which a company centralizes or decentralizes its purchasing function clearly 
plays an important role in aligning the purchasing function with the company’s greater 
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mission and vision. At the time of the data collection, Organization A was currently in the 
process of going from a decentralized purchasing process, meaning that it operated and 
managed regionally, to a more streamlined, centrally managed purchasing structure. In this 
restructuring, one office manages the purchasing for the entire enterprise. This central 
office is deliberately placed with the C-suite executives, whereas it was previously 
managed under the financial functional arm of the company. By nature of this set-up, the 
higher level executives, including the CPO and CEO, have a significant influence over all 
of the purchasing procedures used in the company. In a financial analysis, the company 
found that centralizing the purchasing procedures to one office while also providing a 
central marketplace for common office supplies, similar to the General Services 
Administration used by the DOD, would not only streamline routine purchases but also 
create opportunities for research and development from the money being saved and 
reallocated. Similarly, Organization C also centrally manages all of its procurement except 
for the airbuses themselves. This purchasing function manages a $6 billion portfolio in an 
office of 90 individuals. This alignment mirrors the fact that Organization C keeps all of 
its management and administration to one physical location as well, although they operate 
in hundreds of cities around the globe. By tightening the administration chain of command 
and centralizing its purchasing function to one office, both companies seek to optimize 
spending to the greatest extent possible and have achieved significant success since in 
doing so.  
On the other end of the spectrum, in Organization B, the purchasing process is a 
much more hybrid model of (de)centralization that allows buyers the flexibility and 
opportunity to specialize in the product or prototype they manage. This structure is more 
lateral-based, as the purchasing function is broken up by program, and each program office 
has its own internal purchasing structure, starting with a director who oversees 70 
purchasers within each directorate. The company centrally manages the processes and 
procedures of how purchasing will be executed, but the execution of that purchasing flows 
down depending on dollar threshold and is mainly executed at the lowest levels. The senior 
executives have little influence over what is bought, unless there is a strategic shift from 
the top down in regard to building a strategic shift in purchasing. For example, at the time 
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of this interview, the senior executives of the large aerospace company recommended 
building a strategic alliance with another country by investing in the infrastructure and 
manufacturing of that country by flowing more purchases from this specific partner.  
An important note regarding the success of centralizing versus decentralizing the 
purchasing agent lies in the communication practices between the various functions (e.g., 
Human Resources, Legal) within the greater organization. The researchers found that 
companies that completely centralize their purchasing agents—meaning they have one 
purchasing agent for the entire organization—rely heavily on lateral communication 
among the various functions; thus, although the purchasing agent is responsible for 
purchasing, members from other functional areas are involved in the purchasing process. 
This allows the purchasing agent to fully understand the requirement needed and streamline 
the acquisition process to be as efficient as possible. In the decentralized purchasing 
situation, communication is not nearly as emphasized from higher management or relied 
upon at the lower levels of purchasing. With more flexibility in purchasing decisions, a 
purchaser in a decentralized situation relies less on communication among the various 
departments and instead on the checks-and-balances system found in both the physical 
purchase-writing system and peer-review process to correct for mistakes and errors.  
In comparison, AFMC/PK incorporates elements of both centralization and 
decentralization in its organizational structure, a blend that is appropriate for its mission, 
the size of the organization, and the contract portfolio. AFMC/PK falls under the command 
of both AFMC and AFICC, each serving a different purpose. From a command perspective, 
AFMC/PK has a centralized command structure that stems from AFMC, optimizing 
command and control procedures up and down the AFMC chain and then across the 
functional areas of AFMC, allowing them to be uniform. This is the best structure in regard 
to command, control, and general administration. In contrast to the other functional units 
of AFMC, AFMC/PK maintains the responsibility for executing contracts, for which its 
contracting authority comes from AFICC. In this sense, AFMC/PK utilizes a decentralized 
authority structure. This is due to AFMC/PK delegating contracting decisions to the centers 
within AFMC/PK. For example, anything above a certain threshold skips coordination with 
AFMC/PK and AFICC and is routed straight to SAF/AQC for contract clearance. This 
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semi-hybrid structure is appropriate for how AFMC/PK conducts business while 
coordinating with AFMC on administrative matters; however, it could be significantly 
improved by streamlining contract clearance authority to AFMC/PK and, thus, centralizing 
authority. This centralized approach allows AFMC/PK to become the CPO with direct 
reporting to the CEO equivalent, AFMC/CC, in a centralized purchasing structure for 
contracts greater than $1 billion. Given the size of the individual center contract portfolios, 
decentralized contract clearance authority under $1 billion is appropriate. 
7. Assessment and Ratings 
The researchers provide an assessment of each organization in terms of its 
implementation of specific structural characteristics. Information gathered during the 
interview process was used in addition to other research into the individual organizations. 
This assessment attempts to provide insight into the success of the organization’s current 
purchasing structure in comparison to AFMC/PK. The ratings are based upon the 
organization’s specific approach to each structural characteristic and provide an assessment 
on the implementation within that organization. Based on contingency theory, the same 
approach is not always effective for each organization; therefore, the assessment is based 
only on that organization’s implementation and the effectiveness in meeting the 
organization’s purchasing objectives. Table 5 summarizes the ratings for each organization 
in the respective structural characteristics. Ratings for each organization identify the 
effectiveness of their implementation of each structural characteristic. Ratings are on a 
scale of -, +, and ++, indicating ineffective, somewhat effective, and very effective, 
respectively. These ratings are ultimately grounded from the team’s assessment of the 
interviewees who stressed their specific company’s strengths and weaknesses. These 
attributes are also weighed against the organization’s mission and vision to assess whether 
the current structure was appropriate for that organization. Table 5 also shows the chosen 
level of each structural characteristic for each organization (e.g., high levels of 
standardization, high levels of involvement, etc.). 
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Table 5. Assessments and Ratings of Organizations 





































(De)centralization ++ Centralized ++Hybrid +Centralized - Hybrid 
 
a. Organization A 
Organization A appears to have an effective organizational structure to meet 
organization objectives. The interviewee indicated that the organization has been 
transitioning from a decentralized purchasing process to a centralized purchasing process 
over the past three years. This transition appears to be beneficial in preventing ineffective 
spending and potential fraud issues experienced under decentralized purchasing. 
Formalization within Organization A is an ongoing process; the interviewee indicated that 
they are beginning to formalize processes with the intent of having a highly formalized 
purchasing process. 
b. Organization B 
Organization B was the most effective organization interviewed based upon the 
interviewee’s comments. The organization mirrored some government structural 
characteristics such as standardization and formalization, while also allowing procurement 
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professionals to specialize. This appears to be an advantageous approach, particularly 
within the company’s B2G segment. One characteristic that stood out as effective for 
Organization B was the implementation of a hybrid decision-making approach. 
Organization B successfully implemented the hybrid approach by allowing centers to make 
purchasing decisions and the global supply director to implement strategy. 
c. Organization C 
Organization C had a different approach than other organizations, with low 
standardization, involvement, specialization and formalization. The interviewee did 
indicate that there is some level of specialization within specific programs; however, that 
is often unintentional. One disadvantage of the low involvement approach was alluded to 
during the interview when discussing combatting duopolies among suppliers. The 
interviewee indicated that this situation required involvement by the CPO in order to 
resolve the matter in an advantageous way. One advantage to the low formalization and 
standardization approach is the flexibility to develop innovative solutions to problems. The 
interviewee discussed an angel-investing approach to spurring competition among 
suppliers to achieve advantageous prices for the organization.  
d. AFMC/PK 
AFMC/PK is required to abide by DOD acquisition procedures and, therefore, is forced 
into formalized and standardized acquisition procedures; however, the movement to 
remove the AFMC–specific MPs and PGIs appears to be advantageous to the centers. 
AFMC/PK’s hybrid approach to decision-making and contract clearance authority is 
unique, implementing both a decentralized contract authority and centralized command 
authority construct. AFMC/PK is responsible for aligning both SAF/AQC and AFMC 
strategy within the AFMC contracting centers. While this hybrid approach appears to be 
beneficial to the centers, it does appear to be a counterproductive alignment for AFMC/
PK. Currently, AFMC/PK has low involvement in purchasing decisions. Current alignment 
has AFMC/PK under both SAF/AQC and AFMC/CC, lends to the idea that SAF/AQC 
serves as the CPO and AFMC/CC laterally configured as the CEO, rather than a CPO 
reporting directly to the CEO as found in many private sector organizations. Lastly, AFMC/
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PK seems to have low levels of specialization, opting for more breadth of experience than 
specialized experience. 
8. Analysis Summary 
Our research identified several advantages and disadvantages of AFMC/PK 
structural characteristics when compared to private sector organizations. Table 6 
summarizes the comparison of AFMC/PK to private sector organizations and previous 
research into structural characteristics. It is important to note that contingency theory 
indicates that the appropriate structure for an organization is largely based on the mission 
and strategy of that organization, which was not researched in this study. Analysis is 
based upon the AFMC/PK’s implementation of individual structural characteristics as 
compared to previous literature and trends found among private sector organizations 
interviewed during this research. 
Table 6. Comparison Summary of AFMC/PK to Private Sector 
Organizations 
 





AFMC/ PK Analysis 
Standardization 1. Standardization of an 
organization’s 
procedures, materials, 
and personnel closes 
the gap between risk 
and uncertainty by 
decreasing variability in 
each aspect. 
 
1. Private organizations 
interviewed are 
trending to highly 
standardized 
procedures with some 
deviations based on 
organization strategies 
and goals. 
2. The organizations 
that had high 
standardization also 
further appear to be 
concerned with risk 
due to significant upper 
management 
involvement. 
1. High levels of 
standardization within 
the Air Force are 
appropriate to close 
the gap between 
uncertainty and risk; 
however, previous 
AFMC–specific MPs and 
PGIs were 
acknowledged by 
AFMC as delaying the 
procurement process 
and were subsequently 
removed. 
Involvement 1. Purchasing 
organizations identified 
that uncertainty in 
purchasing situations 
1. Organizations with 
high upper 
management 
involvement, such as 
1. AFMC/PK has limited 
to no involvement in 
purchasing decisions. 
Limited involvement in 
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AFMC/ PK Analysis 
leads to a dependence 
on communication 
networks rooted in 
vertical involvement 
and less reliance on 
communication 
networks rooted in 
vertical involvement for 
predictable purchasing 
environments. 
2. Lateral involvement 
is more important as 
risk and uncertainty of 
the purchasing decision 
increases. 
3. Decreased 
vulnerability of risk and 
uncertainty is 
associated with larger 
purchasing 
organizations but also 
reduces the influence 
of its individuals within 
the organization. 
the CPO reporting 
directly to the CEO/
CFO, appear to be 
primarily concerned 
with procurement risk 
and uncertainty. The 
organization with 
limited involvement 
appears to accept more 
risk. 
 
this specific case also 
indicates that there is 
likely little vertical 
communication. 
Potential positive 
impacts of low 
involvement include 
flexibility in purchasing 
at the center level and 
increased innovation.  
Specialization 1. Specialization by 
function allows for 
more efficient and 
cost-saving practices. 
2. Specialization allows 
purchasers to fully 
understand products 
and/or functions, which 
allows them to respond 
with succinct clarity to 
complex problems and 
environmental 
uncertainty. 







determining factor in 
whether the 
organization 
specialized or not was 
based on organization 
objectives and 
priorities. 
1. Given the AFMC 
mission, specialization 
does not seem to be 
necessary for all 
purchase types. AFMC/
PK instead chooses for 
employees to have a 
breadth of experience; 
however, it may be 
important to analyze 
potential impacts of 
specialization within 
novel or complex 
purchases (e.g., IT, AI, 
etc.). 
Configuration 1. Efficiency gains 
within an organization 
are not due to 
reconfiguration caused 
by height and span of 
control width 
remaining unchanged. 
2. CPOs reporting to 
executive positions 
1. Organizations with 
the higher perceived 
risk were more likely to 
configure laterally, 
relying on lateral 
communication and a 
team approach. 
1. Researchers in this 
study found 
configuration to be the 
result of the other five 
characteristics, this is 
consistent with 
literature that argues 
configuration is highly 
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AFMC/ PK Analysis 
within firms increases 
organizational 
effectiveness due to 
higher organizational 
visibility and the 
leveraging of additional 
resources. 
3. The overall size of an 
organization may not 
be itself a “critical” 
characteristic of an 
organization; rather, 
bureaucracy within an 
organization stems 
more from the 
complexity of the 
organization itself. 
variable based on 
organization goals. 
2. Researchers found 
no indication that the 
vertical configuration 




Formalization 1. Despite other 
benefits, unfamiliar 
purchasing situations 
and novel purchases 
benefit from a less 
formalized purchasing 
structure. 
2. Informal strategies 
of purchasing, less 
rules, procedures, and 
instructions may 
provide benefits to 
unfamiliar purchases. 




benefit from greater 
formalization. 
1. Formalization varied 




or delegation of 
authority. Multiple 
organizations identified 
the advantages of a 
center of excellence 
approach to model 
procurement rather 
than formalized rules 
and procedures. 
1. There is high 
formalization at AFMC/
PK and throughout Air 
Force contracting 
organizations due to 
rigorous FAR and other 
requirements. Novel 
purchases at the 
individual centers (such 
as AFRL) could be 
hampered by the 
overly formalized 
procedures. 




through the limiting of 
direct authority and 
power of subordinate 
departments. 
2. (De)centralization is 
not a one-size-fits-all 
solution and varies 
based on needs and 
1. Organizations are 
trending toward a 
centralized approach, 
with some choosing to 




purchasing as a major 
concern in a cost-
driven culture. 
Unaligned spending 
1. The hybrid model for 
AFMC/PK is 
appropriate given its 
mission and strategies; 
however, this model 
would be more 
effective if contract 
clearance authority was 
held at AFMC/PK. 
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3. Higher risks of 
corruption, fraud, 
waste, and excessive 




structures lead to 
improved purchase 
response time, reduced 






5. Hybrid structures 
allow organizations to 
utilize strengths of both 
decentralized and 
centralized strategies. 
was considered to be a 




C. RECOMMENDATIONS  
The ultimate takeaway from our findings is that the structure of the purchasing 
organization is not a one-size-fits-all approach. There are many ways in which AFMC is 
leading the way in regard to aligning strategic goals and purpose with purchasing 
organization execution. There are also a few ways in which industry has the advantage, 
though these vary in their applicability to AFMC. One such industry advantage is that there 
is less bureaucratic inertia slowing down the execution process. Putting aside that obvious 
distinction, there are parallels that can be drawn between industry’s focus on Business to 
Customer (B2C) and B2B relationships and AFMC’s B2G relationships that can give 
AFMC a competitive edge, as explained in the following recommendations. Our research 
supports three recommendations: AFMC/PK should address areas of involvement and 
purchasing policy, decision-making structure (decentralized, centralized, hybrid), and 
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specialization and formalization. Other structural characteristics analyzed in this study 
were found to be either less significant based on the data collected, or AFMC/PK was 
already demonstrating practices consistent within industry and previous research. These 
recommendations are given in no particular order. It is important to note the following 
recommendations are based on the preceding literature review, findings, and analysis. The 
government institutions currently in place would have to be further researched and 
analyzed in order to effectively implement any of the following recommendations. 
1. Strategic Supply Chain Management  
Our research shows that a significant challenge to the future success of AFMC/PK, 
and DOD contracting in general, stems from a combination of a risk-averse culture and 
historically adversarial B2G relationships (Gansler et al., 2013). The following 
recommendation focuses on the latter. This recommendation looks to improve AFMC/
PK’s level of involvement and standardization while also incorporating the theme of 
adaptable purchasing policy found throughout the companies interviewed. During the 
researchers’ interviews and research, it became evident that companies that held a more 
competitive posture over their counterparts in the market had made efforts toward fostering 
better working relationships with their contractors. In short, these relationships were not 
solely utilitarian in nature, but instead focused on a mutually beneficial business 
partnership that not only strengthened established B2B relationships but also attracted new, 
innovative businesses that threatened dominating monopolies and industry concentration, 
both of which lead to a lack of competition and thus provide less impetus to improve critical 
products and services.  
Strengthening B2B relationships can be carried out in a number of ways. In our 
interview with a major airline company, the purchasing function found that there were only 
two large providers of catering services for meals on flights. With this duopoly, the airliner 
saw prices slowly increase over the years with little leverage to challenge the established 
contractors. Through market research conducted by the purchasers, the purchasing function 
found a number of smaller businesses that provided the same catering service, with a 
greater quality of food, but did not hold the capacity to meet the demands of the major 
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airliner. As a solution, the purchasing function presented a radical plan to its CFO that 
showed investing in a number of these smaller companies to build their capital and expand 
their capacity benefitted the airliner in three significant ways. First, building the capacity 
of these smaller businesses saved them money in comparison to staying in business with 
the incumbent contractors. The smaller businesses provided a higher quality product at a 
fraction of the cost of the incumbents. Second, the higher quality food service turned out 
to be a huge factor for the consumer, thus building customer loyalty. Third, the incumbents, 
in turn, came back to the airliner with significantly lower prices than it had offered before, 
creating more competition in the market. In exchange for investment in their growth, the 
smaller businesses were contractually tied to this airliner and were prohibited from 
providing services to other airliners for an undisclosed amount of years. This contractual 
set-up fostered a trusting, mutually beneficial relationship for both the airliner and small 
businesses.  
According to Gansler et al. (2013), the DOD is not seen as an attractive marketplace 
for non-traditional contractors and many commercial contractors. A current real-world 
example of this has played out in the research and development of a COVID-19 vaccine. 
In a statement on the development of a vaccine, Pfizer CEO Albert Bourla emphasized that 
efficiency and speed of developing a vaccine was of the utmost importance; thus, the 
company refused to accept government funds in research and development to “liberate our 
scientists from any bureaucracy” (Klar, 2020). Bourla did not state that his refusal was 
directly tied to terms and conditions outside data rights, time to get on contract, or post-
award management. It could be a combination of the factors listed or simply be a data rights 
issue; however, a risk mitigation strategy and a strong loyalty base could alleviate these 
potential concerns. It is imperative that the government take proactive measures to keep 
this situation from becoming a trend, as it puts contracting and acquisitions in a weaker 
competitive posture compared to private markets. In a current effort to mitigate this 
problem, the Air Force has implemented the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) 
program. This program aims to mirror venture capital funding utilized in private markets 
(Gaster et al., 2019). This program has been implemented Air Force–wide, and while its 
role in contracting and relationship to AFMC/PK are not specifically defined, there is 
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potential for AFMC/PK to create added value to the program and increase its involvement 
both laterally and vertically. In an empirical study on the long-term effects of the SBIR 
program, economist Josh Lerner (1999) found that there are many long-term benefits to 
SBIR awardees, including growth in employment and sales as compared to firms in the 
same field. However, these firms’ continued growth could be attributed to follow-on 
procurement contracts with the government, which does not necessarily prove the company 
could be equally successful without their reliance on government contracts. Additionally, 
the SBIR program tends to focus on niche areas of developing information and technology 
where there are few start-up companies to begin with (Lerner, 1999). Additional barriers 
of entry for businesses that would like to enter into B2G contracts are the considerably high 
costs and manpower hours required to learn the ropes of entering the bid process and 
submitting a competitive proposal for government contracts (Josephson et al., 2019). 
AFMC’s strict formalization of processes and procedures ties the government’s hands in 
being flexible to mirroring contracts in the private sector and eliminating bureaucracies 
that deflect companies from entering business partnerships with the government, such as 
the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA). In addition, Josephson et al. (2019) pointed out the 
following additional bureaucracies that might deter businesses from doing business with 
the government: being subject to federal audits and negative media attention, having 
required provisions and clauses built into government contracts that establish rights and 
corrections that might appear unfavorable to the contractor, and the unique aspect of being 
so closely tied to the specific political climate, which ultimately makes the program subject 
to potential budget cuts or reductions. Although the companies interviewed stated they 
were in the process of formalizing procedures to tighten up spending, the major airliner 
saw the lack of formalization as an advantage to utilizing unique procurement techniques 
to disrupt non-competitive markets.  
AFMC engages the nontraditional vendor base via the SBIR program within the 
AFRL Center; however, AFMC/PK’s specific role is not clearly defined. There are few, if 
any, Contracting Officer positions within the AFRL. There are examples of SBIRs being 
executed outside of the AFRL, specifically at Air Force Pitch Day, in which teams across 
the AFLCMC put together SBIRs, yet this was a unique example found of SBIRs being 
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discussed within AFMC/PK and outside of the AFRL. It could be incredibly beneficial to 
have a staff area in AFMC/PK dedicated to strategic supply chain management. Within 
this element, AFMC/PK can establish a liaison to the SBIR program who gives 
recommendations or expertise on strategic supplier management across the centers and 
works with an AFMC/PK small business representative, AFWERX, and the AFRL. In 
addition, this position could serve as a liaison to AFMC and the AFRL from a purchasing 
perspective while also serving as a monitor for growing opportunities, identifying new 
areas where SBIR can be applied and analyzing areas where the B2G relationship can be 
improved by minimizing entries to barrier or levels of bureaucracy that would normally 
deter a company from entering into a business relationship with the government. This level 
of involvement was found to be successful within Organization C and can be appropriately 
applied to AFMC/PK. This suggestion looks to improve AFMC/PK’s level of involvement, 
both laterally and vertically, in that it creates a key added value as a purchasing advisor to 
a critical program that is relatively in its infancy but has the potential to both improve the 
Air Force’s access to non-traditional contractors and actively engage in building the 
market. For the AFMC/PK staff member, it is worth considering looking at the level of 
bureaucracies incorporated into the SBIR program and whether companies developed 
within this program can operate fluidly between government and private markets. The 
Pfizer example mentioned previously presents a potential case study for digging into what 
bureaucracies deterred the company from accepting government funds and then analyzing 
which of these bureaucracies are absolutely necessary to the process. The risk of not 
examining contracting processes to find out which bureaucracies are potential deterrents is 
substantial in that private companies will look elsewhere for funding in developing critical 
and necessary technologies in order to circumvent the ties that come with working with the 
government, thus deteriorating the government’s competitive posture in the global market.  
2. Assume CPO Role for AFMC 
Our research recommends that AFMC/PK assume the role of a CPO for AFMC 
while maintaining the current hybrid or center-led purchasing structure with some minor 
modifications to find the right balance of the structural component of centralization. 
According to our research, private sector organizations rely heavily on the CPO to develop 
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strategic sourcing strategies and stay involved in supplier selections and procurement 
decisions. Additionally, organizations that had the CPO reporting directly to the CEO or 
CFO found improvements in effectiveness within the purchasing function. Organizations 
interviewed in this study highlighted the role of the CPO in purchases of strategic 
importance or significant dollar value, such as aircraft procurement within a major airliner.  
During our research, it became evident that AFMC/PK currently uses a hybrid 
purchasing structure. This hybrid approach proves to be the most conducive to streamlining 
decision-making and provides significant advantages in speed and cost savings compared 
to a decentralized model; however, in order for AFMC/PK to function as a CPO equivalent 
for AFMC, there are regulations and authorities that must be delegated from SAF/AQC. 
We found in our research that AFMC/PK is not the Contract Approval Authority (CAA) 
for AFMC. The CAA has been delegated to the centers themselves unless required by 
regulation to be held at SAF/AQC. Due to the situational characteristics within the AFMC/
PK acquisition portfolio, a hybrid or center-led approach allows the most flexibility while 
also maintaining appropriate levels of internal controls. Centralized purchasing structures, 
while effective in maintaining control, can stifle innovation and present unnecessary delays 
in complex purchases or complex products. In contrast, a hybrid, center-led approach 
allows for the advantages of centralized control maintained at an appropriate level, while 
also allowing decentralized decision-making at sub-units or organizations with specified 
tasks. The distinction between command authority and contracting authority is important 
within a center-led approach, given the nature of being able to obligate the government to 
a legally binding contract. Centers should receive command authority from a source that 
guides strategic decision-making for the organization at large, such as AFMC/CC.  
Our recommendation includes shifting contracting clearance authority from SAF/
AQC back to AFMC/PK. For the purpose of this recommendation, contract clearance refers 
to the authority to approve a contract solicitation and the authority to approve the Source 
Selection Authority (SSA) to make the decision to award. This movement toward 
centralized purchasing authority greater than $1 billion aligns with literature on CPO roles. 
Currently AFMC/PK is not directly involved in the purchasing process, but is instead 
responsible for aligning SAF/AQC policies and AFMC strategy within the centers. By 
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delegating contract clearance to AFMC/PK, this responsibility would shift back to AFMC/
PK, giving it an added value in providing critical contract clearance, but with a standing 
foundational understanding of the requirement due to the proximity of the requirement 
owner. This alignment mirrors best practices found in industry under the analogy of 
AFMC/PK acting as the CPO who reports directly to AFMC/CC, which serves as the CEO 
in this scenario. This is consistent with the previous literature that states organizations with 
effective purchasing practices often align the CPO role directly below CEO/CFO due to 
the availability and visibility of resources (Trent, 2004). This shift would alleviate SAF/
AQC of clearance authority for AFMC/PK. The intent is not to disconnect completely from 
SAF/AQC, as the relationship between AFMC/PK and SAF/AQC is highly valuable; 
however, SAF/AQC will act more in an advisory role, mirroring Organization C’s 
relationship between the CEO and CPO, where the CPO ultimately made the purchasing 
decisions, relying on the CEO as an advisor when needed for either a critical buy or 
executing a new purchasing strategy that would significantly influence the organization’s 
operations. It is important to note that our recommendation does not include shifting roles 
within the centers back to AFMC/PK, but rather delegating roles from SAF/AQC to 
AFMC/PK. If AFMC/PK were to not more closely mirror CPO roles and responsibilities, 
the growing importance of AFMC/PK may not be leveraged to its fullest extent and would 
instead hinder AFMC/PK’s influence over its centers. 
While our research shows more private companies are moving to centralized 
purchasing structures, contingency theory indicates that the situational characteristics of 
the organization dictate decision-making. Some companies interviewed indicated that 
purchasing decisions for products of strategic importance were maintained at the CPO 
level, while the company using a center-led approach indicated that individual centers had 
the authority to make these purchases, provided they complied with strategic policies 
established by the higher purchasing authority. This concept allows for greater flexibility 
and more rapid acquisitions while also maintaining acquisition control.  
96 
3. Specialized Purchasing Program Tracks 
Our research indicates that specialization at the lowest levels of purchasing 
execution is commonly used among companies to gain a competitive edge in the market. 
Some companies allow the specialization of skillsets within specific product or purchasing 
categories, such as commodity purchases or enterprise sourcing acquisitions. Organization 
B, which is the company that best mirrors AFMC, allowed for specialization, especially in 
developing areas such as technology. This led to both greater work satisfaction and a higher 
degree of ownership from the individuals in the specialized categories. In addition, the 
areas of which specialization is applied is incredibly niche and complex, requiring all 
individuals involved to be both well-versed in their expertise and also maintain the ability 
to translate important concepts to the general public in a common language.  
All organizations interviewed acknowledged the importance of specialization. 
Most organizations used consulting firms to fill the gaps of required skillsets, where they 
had yet to develop specialization. Multiple companies use a program-specific purchasing 
officer in order to develop better communication within the team and internal stakeholders. 
Those companies indicated that rather than forcing purchasing officers to eventually move 
to new programs, those purchasing officers would continue to work on that specific 
program for an undisclosed time. Those companies indicated that this practice creates more 
effective teams and has been proven by internal metrics to be advantageous to the program.  
It is recommended that AFMC/PK implements a program that allows civilians, and 
military to the greatest extent possible, to intentionally specialize in areas of high technical 
complexity and high commercial uncertainty, such as complex technologies and artificial 
intelligence. This is supported by the literature stating that these are the two factors of 
complexity to be considered (McCabe, 1987). These two areas are highly technical and 
require in-depth expertise and knowledge of the intricacies of these systems that a 
generalization approach neither fits nor is conducive to finding the best resources. These 
are also two developing areas that will become a great hurdle for the DOD if a proactive 
approach is not taken sooner rather than later, while the United States’ adversaries forge 
ahead in becoming subject matter experts in these areas. 
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A program of this sort would require a member of the AFMC/PK staff to not only 
monitor the success of pilot specialized tracks but also identify developing areas in which 
the specialized track can be implemented. In addition, the individuals themselves, who are 
selected to specialize, should be brought to the AFMC/PK staff, mirroring how 
Organization C allotted its most critical purchase category to a member on the C-suite 
executive staff due to the product’s unique characteristics and significance to the 
organization’s overall success. This positioning on the staff alleviates the member from 
having to route purchasing decisions that may potentially require quick decisions. Routing 
a decision where the purchaser maintains the subject matter expertise and the purchasing 
approval channels are not familiar with the product could lead to program inertia in these 
critical developing areas. Allowing civilians to specialize in these programs and also fund 
outside institute education opportunities to learn more about these technologies would 
provide a great benefit to AFMC/PK’s future strategic posture. It would be beneficial to 
create a committee internal to AFMC/PK to look at its spending portfolio and identify niche 
areas that require an intricate knowledge of the system and future projection of that system. 
After identifying the programs and individuals who are willing to opt into a specialization 
tract, AFMC/PK can partner with higher education institutions that offer classes and 
specialized tracks in these topics and send identified candidates to specialized courses to 
learn more about their niche areas of purchasing. This mirrors a number of special 
experience exchange duty (SPEED) programs offered by the Air Force for acquisition and 
contracting officers to spend a year interning with an operational system, specializing in 
that specific weapons system or operational environment, and then bringing that 
knowledge back to the purchasing world. Not only does this present the opportunity for 
purchasers to gain a rich understanding of their operating environment, the players in the 
market, and what to look for in the market, thus applying the best purchasing tactics, but 
this also offsets the administrative burden that is associated with moving personnel from 
office to office and reduces the time spent getting personnel up to speed within a program. 
Furthermore, if specialization is allowed in this way, promotion advancement and position 
grades may be based on tiers within a specialty as opposed to value being derived from an 
individual having a less in-depth, but more diverse, set of purchasing experiences. 
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D. SUMMARY 
This chapter included a discussion of the research results of the researchers’ study. 
Specifically, the chapter outlined the researchers’ findings, analysis, and finally, the 
researchers’ recommendations for Air Force contracting. In the next and final chapter, the 
research team provides their research summary, conclusion, and considerations for areas 
of future research. 
99 
VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND AREAS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
This chapter provides a summary of our research and research conclusions and 
introduces our suggested areas for future research. The purpose of this study was to 
investigate the structure, roles, and authority of the purchasing functions within large, 
private sector organizations and compare our findings to the U.S. Air Force’s purchasing 
organization. In Chapter I, we identified the purpose, the importance of the research, our 
research questions, and the outline of the report. 
A. SUMMARY 
The importance of the research team’s research was driven by the goal to 
continuously improve the purchasing function within the Air Force. Obtaining a fresh 
perspective on purchasing structures, roles, and authority strategies from organizations 
outside of the Air Force may only benefit the Air Force’s own capabilities and efficiencies.  
This research is the first time the roles, structure, and authority of AFMC/PK has 
been systematically evaluated and compared to private industry. An additional goal of this 
research is to provide an executive summary and technical report with recommendations 
for Air Force contracting in addition to our complete thesis and analysis for consideration 
in implementing changes and improvements to AFMC’s six contracting centers and core 
mission areas.  
B. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this research was to compare and analyze the purchasing functions 
of large, private sector organizations outside of the U.S. Air Force and to identify beneficial 
attributes and characteristics of their purchasing organizational structures and designs that 
could be adopted internally. As mentioned in Chapter I, AFMC’s total spend for FY 2020 
was $67 billion, which equated to nearly one third of total Air Force spending for the year. 
The spending responsibility of AFMC is unparalleled within the Air Force. The Air Force 
purchasing organizations within AFMC would strongly benefit from research into what 
other organizations are doing to achieve high-quality quality results and high efficiencies.  
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The following are the research team’s answers to the research questions posed in 
Chapter I based upon their research and analysis. 
Primary research question: How do the Air Force contracting structure, roles, 
and authorities compare with the purchasing functions of private sector 
organizations? 
Answer: Comparisons between private sector organizations and the current Air 
Force Contracting structure are largely based on contingency theory and the differences in 
goals and strategy. Throughout this study, the researchers focused on analyzing AFMC 
rather than Air force contracting as a whole. This is an important distinction given that not 
all Air Force contracting organizations can be generalized based on the research in this 
study. Organizations interviewed indicated that high levels of centralization or various 
hybrid models are becoming increasingly advantageous in meeting organization goals and 
managing spend appropriately. Organizations indicated that the size of the purchasing 
organization is relatively small compared to the overall organization size, and the 
purchasing organization is maintained with direct reporting to high level executives (CEO/
CFO). This allows more internal control of purchasing and better category management 
practices within the purchasing function. This is vastly different from the AFMC 
contracting structure as a whole, based upon the goals and the size of the organization. Two 
companies interviewed had specific mission sets and organization goals that allowed for 
little variation and the need for multiple skillsets within purchasing. AFMC has a vast span 
of mission sets and corresponding purchasing skillsets that require a level of 
decentralization across the contracting community.  
Secondary research question 1: What are the advantages and disadvantages 
of the current Air Force contracting structure within AFMC? 
AFMC contracting structure is consistent with industry practices as it pertains to 
organization goals and strategy. Contingency theory indicates that purchasing structure 
will vary based upon the goals of the organization. While AFMC’s strategy is specifically 
defined, the required mission capabilities and skillsets are vast. Based upon various 
purchase situations, it is necessary for some elements of decentralization to be present 
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within the organization. Therefore, the center-led approach for AFMC/PK is advantageous 
for meeting the mission demands without causing unnecessary delays. A center-led 
approach allows AFMC/PK to give flexibility to each center to make purchasing decisions, 
while also maintaining internal controls, specifically with category and spend management.  
A disadvantage in the current AFMC/PK structure is the lack of contract clearance 
authority. Private organizations interviewed use a structure in which strategic decisions are 
made within a functional director, while purchasing decisions are maintained with the CPO 
usually reporting directly to the CEO or CFO. The lack of contract clearance authority at 
AFMC/PK is not consistent with industry practices and removes AFMC/PK from the 
purchasing process entirely. In private organizations, CPOs have complete authority over 
all purchasing professionals, who partner with internal stakeholders to determine how and 
when to make purchases. Additionally, CPOs are responsible for aligning purchasing goals 
with the organizational strategies, aided by the direct lines of reporting to the CEO. 
Secondary research question 2: How can the Air Force better model its 
purchasing structure, roles, and authorities? 
The research team’s research indicates that the Air Force is currently utilizing 
similar practices, policies, and procedures as large, private industry organizations. It is 
important to note an iterative and feedback-focused approach, including additional 
research, will enable the Air Force to vector check its organizational structure and its 
effectiveness in the future. 
Secondary research question 3: How do the private sector organizations 
establish roles and authorities within the purchasing functions? 
Private sector organizations vary in how they establish roles and authorities within 
the purchasing function, with no two companies having similar practices; however, all 
organizations interviewed indicated a shift toward allowing complete control of purchasing 
roles and responsibilities at the CPO level in conjunction with direct reporting to the CEO 
or CFO. Additionally, all organizations indicated that roles and authorities were either 
formalized or in transition to being formalized.  
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C. LIMITATIONS 
We identified several limitations of this study. Each limitation is acknowledged and 
discussed in the remainder of this section. 
By conducting interviews with private sector organizations, the researchers hoped 
to establish a generalization of purchasing practices or obtain information on an exemplar 
organization. Based on the limited number of responses, neither objective was achieved. A 
factor for future iterations of this study is the willingness of industry to share information 
regarding overarching strategy and internal controls. A significant limitation came from 
companies neither wanting to be identified by name nor divulge information that could 
lead to a lack of control over how that information would be treated. In order to generalize 
industry practices in purchasing, more responses are required to allow researchers to 
identify trends across multiple organizations. Additionally, based on the interviews 
conducted, the researchers are not able to confidently identify any of the three responders, 
all on the fortune 500 list, as an exemplar of the industry’s top performing purchasing 
organizations.  
The goals of private organizations are vastly different from that of a public 
organization such as AFMC in this study. The researchers recognize that the goal of making 
a profit is paramount in private industry, while AFMC is primarily concerned with mission 
capabilities aligning with public policy and national strategy. Additionally, the vast size of 
the AFMC in terms of personnel as well as contract portfolio is well above that of any 
organization interviewed.  
D. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The first area for future research would be additional case study analysis in the 
immediate future on investing in small businesses. One organization discussed the concept 
of investing in small businesses in order to increase the competitive market for certain 
products or services. This is similar to the DOD requirement for spend within various 
socioeconomic groups. The primary difference within this organization was the specific 
investment in a company that presented a capability in exchange for becoming a preferred 
supplier. The organization saw immediate advantages within that competitive pool in terms 
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of decreased prices and improved performance due to new competition in the market. 
Previous duopolies that received all of the contracts were forced to become more 
competitive due to the new competition within the market.  
A second area for future research would be an extension of our current research 
with an increased focus on obtaining additional interviews with large, private industry 
organizations. Using our current research as a foundational basis would allow future 
researchers to leverage our recommendations and conclusions as a basis for their additional 
research. Furthermore, researchers should allow themselves to conduct second and third 
interviews with the same large, private industry organizations to allow for further follow-
up and additional considerations to earlier conversations. 
A third area for future research would be to consider additional structural 
characteristics and purchasing situations that impact purchasing organizational structure. 
Our list of nine factors is not entirely inclusive of all characteristics of a purchasing 
organization. Taking into consideration less-researched characteristics may prove to close 
the remaining knowledge gaps. 
A final area for future research is a comparison of the private sector’s organization 
approach to category management with that of AFMC/PK. Our research indicates that 
AFMC/PK currently has a category management council responsible for implementing 
category management strategies into purchasing decisions; however, specific research into 
the function and effectiveness of the council would be advantageous to AFMC/PK. Future 
research could include analyzing the industry practices of recruiting and training category 
management experts as well as investing in autonomous category management systems.  
While this study focused on AFMC/PK’s role in procurement, the researchers 
identify the potential for analyzing other Air Force contracting agencies using the same 
methodology. AFMC represents a large conglomerate of Air Force Contracting Centers 
and Squadrons, however there are other organizations that contract for various products 
and services that should be explored as well. Applying similar methodology to other Air 
Force contracting organizations in comparison to private sector organizations could be an 
area of future research. 
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APPENDIX: LIST OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Where does [company name] place the purchasing function within the organizational 
structure? How does [company name] assign purchasing authority vertically and laterally?  
 
How and where are the roles and responsibilities of the purchasing function written down? 
•  Do [company name’s] policies cover all of the purchasing function’s typical roles 
and responsibilities?  
•  Can you give examples of roles or responsibilities that policies do not cover 
explicitly? 
 
What policies does [company name] have in place to enforce the roles and responsibilities? 
 How does [company name] address deviations from those policies? 
 Can you give examples of deviations that [company name] handles informally? 
 
How do [company name’s] policies describe upper management’s role in purchasing 
decisions? 
 
What written rules or guidelines are established by [company name’s] highest executive 
level? 
•  How do lower levels at [company name] use these guidelines? 
•  What formal rules and informal practices have been established at lower levels? 
 
How does [company name] categorize spending within the purchasing function? 
 
How does [company name] encourage communication and relationships between 
functional areas and managerial tiers? 
 
Can you describe an example of how the purchasing function in [company name] altered 
its structure or organizational placement to adapt to new and/or additional missions or 
businesses? 
 
Can you describe an example of when [company name’s] leadership utilized the purchasing 
function as a strategic asset in gaining a competitive edge in the market? 
 
What factors does [company name] consider in determining the number of buyers and 
authorities delegated within the purchasing function? 
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